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In response to the ‘Gilets Jaunes’ movement, and the general sentiments of the elitism and 
illegitimacy of French government which sparked it, President Macron organised the Citizens’ 
Convention for Climate (CCC): a participatory forum of 150 citizens, randomly selected to 
deliberate in a unique model of ‘co-construction’ with experts, which over the summer of 2020 
produced 149 legislative proposals, including for constitutional amendment. The thesis 
explores the actual and potential impact of the CCC on French governance. It shows that, while 
the resulting projet de loi introduced by the French Government into the National Assembly 
resulted from the CCC’s proposals—as opposed to the Conseil d’État which usually drafts the 
Government’s proposed bills—the CCC did not actually replace the ordinary legislative 
procedure, as some proponents of citizens’ assemblies would hope, but rather found its 
proposals thoroughly amended by it. In a deconstructive analysis, I will argue that the CCC’s 
actual normative impact was limited by its consultative constitutional nature, within the 
broader context of a French Constitution haunted by the spectral traces of its colonial origins 
and its historical tradition of supreme executive power. However, the CCC nonetheless has the 
potential to impact the future of French governance, in particular due to the further 
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Figure 1: Abbé (Emmanuel Joseph) Sieyès, ‘Illustration of Social and Constitutional Order’  
 (July 1789) Archives Nationales de France 
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In this thesis, I will be exploring the recent event of the Citizens’ Convention for Climate (from 
here on, the ‘CCC’):1 a constitutional experiment in participatory democracy, which took place 
in France from 2019 to 2020. This thesis lies upon a rhizomatic quilt of the interwoven themes 
of legislation, governance, participation and design, which is embodied within the above sketch 
by Abbé Sieyès: a prominent constitutional theorist, drafter and ‘founder’ of the 1st French 
Republic. The central research question I will be exploring in this thesis is: what is the actual 
and potential impact of the CCC on French governance? By way of introduction to this research 
question, which I will be seeking to answer throughout the course of the thesis, I have drawn 
inspiration from the methodology for a material cultural analysis, in order to use the sketch as 
a prompt. Jules David Prown defines material culture as the ‘study through artefacts of the 
beliefs-values, ideas, attitudes, and assumptions-of a particular community or society at a given 
time’,2 and thus through this lens, we may get a hint at the constitutional zeitgeist Sieyès has 
captured in his sketch.  With Prown’s assistance, I will analyse Sieyès sketch to elucidate the 
themes which this thesis will be engaging with.  
 
Prown’s methodological guidance suggests that a material cultural analysis of an object begin 
with a practical physical description. I will explore the history and context behind the sketch 
below, but will start by describing what I personally can see. The object in this case is 
substantially a yellowed aging paper containing a geometric sketch, neatly hand-drawn upon 
in black ink: it can be considered art, which Prown also classifies as material culture.3 The 
content of the drawing seems to be  a graphical visualisation of the hypothetical hierarchical 
 
1 Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat in the original French, for translation see e.g. Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet, et 
al. “Deliberating on Climate Action: Insights from the French Citizens’ Convention for Climate” (HAL 2021) 
https://hal-enpc.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03119539/document. 
2 Jules David Prown, ‘Mind in Matter: An Introduction to Material Culture Theory and Method’, Winterthur 
Portfolio, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 1982), p1. 
3 Ibid.  
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relationships within a republican constitution between its judicial, executive and legislative 
branches, for a France on the cusp of revolution, as well as how legal norms are translated into 
society. A formal analysis of the sketch would highlight that the illustration takes up the entire 
length of the page, and that the external skeleton is in the shape of a vertically long pentagon. 
Within this exoskeleton, Sieyès has superimposed two pyramids into a diamond to form the 
top of the pentagon. In French, the top pyramid, and thus the tip of the pentagon shape, 
designates within a spheric speech bubble: ‘the Constitution’ as its peak, comprised of the 
‘rights of man’ and the ‘constitutional jury’. At the base of this top pyramid, the three branches 
of government are laid out evenly within their own respective spheres, in the following order 
from left to right: ‘the judiciary’, ‘the legislature’, and ‘the executive’. This base serves as a 
border for the bottom pyramid, whose own zenith facing downwards, contains a sphere which 
states: ‘the promulgation of the law’. Overall, the legislature is at the centre of the diamond 
formed by the two pyramids, and tendon-like lines connect all the spheres of text, illustrating 
the intertwining of each limb of government. Finally, within the exoskeleton of the pentagon 
below the diamond, split three distinct linear beams stretching down the infinite remaining 
space within the sketch.  
 
The second phase of the material cultural analysis is that of critical deduction based off of our 
descriptive observations. A sensory engagement with the sketch to my own eyes has it appear 
visually as somewhat anthropomorphic, as if it were a skeletal inversion of the Hobbesian 
Leviathan, though with the executive overtaken by the legislative at the centre of the 
constitutional arrangements, presumably to indicate the republican democracy sought by 
Sieyès to replace the arbitrary monarchic rule of King Louis XVI he and his revolutionary 
 10 
compatriots had lived under.4 This anthropomorphism of government is reminiscent also of 
that ill-fated king’s ancestor; King Louis XIV’s earlier omnipotent declaration ‘I am the state’.  
 
My emotional response to the object is that the sketch reminds me somewhat of a ferris wheel 
in its shape, with each spherical constitutional cabin balanced onto a diamond of governance 
supported by the tripod foundation of society, and each cabin rotating in turn for its moment 
of sovereignty; or else perhaps I am inclined to view the drawing almost as a battery circuit, 
with the Constitution as generator, the three sub-ordinate institutions as circuit breakers, and 
the promulgation of law as the lightbulb to be powered. In either case, I cannot help but view 
the sketch as illustrative of the tension between the spheres to be considered the ultimate 
sovereign, either at the top of the structure, or in the centre of the diamond: Sieyès appears to 
be depicting a delicate constitutional vignette of the balance of power, within the overarching 
structure symbolising the State of France itself. 
 
Finally, we see that the sketch dates back to sometime in the turbulent July of 1789, when the 
historical storming of the Bastille prison on the 14th of July 1789 symbolised the beginning of 
the French Revolution. An intellectual engagement with the object inspires me to consider 
Sophie Boyron, who writes on the (legal) history of the French Constitutions, and explains that 
in 1789, the General Estates (a Parliament of sorts for a monarchic France) were convened by 
the King for the first time in over 150 years due to increasing political unrest in the polity, and 
was constituted by representatives of three estates: the clergy, the aristocracy and the common 
people.5 In response to a stalemate in the deliberations, the political theorist and Catholic Abbé 
 
4 Thomas Hobbes, ‘Leviathan’ (Richard Tuck ed, 1st edn, Cambridge University Press 1996, originally 
published 1651). 
5 Sophie Boyron, ‘The Constitution of France: A Contextual Analysis’ (Hart Publishing, 2013). 
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Sieyès published a pamphlet entitled ‘what is the 3rd estate?’, referring to the final and least 
privileged estate of the common people. In it, he famously answered: ‘What is the 3rd Estate? 
Everything. What has it been hitherto in the political order? Nothing. What does it desire to 
be? Something.’,6 and thus in following Thomas Paine’s call to arms in the recently established 
United States of America against despotism in his own pamphlet ‘Common Sense’,7 Sieyès 
introduced the general French population to the republican ideas of the Enlightenment,8 and 
precipitated the revolution to come. Due to his pamphlet’s viral popularity, Sieyès was elected 
a deputy from Paris of the 3rd estate of the common people to the General Estates, and soon 
afterwards he initiated the motion to merge all three estates into a single National Assembly, 
with equal power to the King.9 This was the birth of the first democratic French Parliament, 
which famously swore an oath at the Versailles Tennis Court promising ‘not to separate, and 
to reassemble wherever circumstances require, until the constitution of the kingdom is 
established and consolidated upon solid foundations’, in a constitutional moment somewhat 
palimpsestic of the American 1776 Declaration of Independence, or even the UK’s 1215 
Magna Carta, both of which introduced a Parliament distinct from the monarchy into their 
respective polities.10 It was not long before the Tennis Court Oath resulted in the first French 
Constitution towards the end of 1789, which included the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen’, both of which Sieyès helped draft, and which were adopted in 1791, officially 
beginning the First French Republic.  
 
 
6 Abbé Sieyès, ‘What is the 3rd Estate?’ (Pall Mall Press 1963, originally published 1789). 
7 Thomas Paine, ‘Common Sense’ (Verso 2009, originally published 1776). 
8 Montesquieu, ‘The Spirit of the Laws’ (Cambridge University Press 1989, originally published 1748). 
9 Boyron, supra, note 5. 
10 Ibid.  
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To return to the sketch then with this historical context in mind, it would appear that Sieyès 
designed his vision of what would become France’s first republican constitution, at the time he 
was helping to draft it. Sieyès was a founding member of the Girondin party along with ally 
Thomas Paine, which had initially been part of the original revolutionary club of the Jacobins, 
before that party bifurcated into the Girondins and Montagnards, who held differing views of 
governance: the former were analogous to modern republican and liberal legal 
constitutionalists, while the latter were anti-liberal and nationalist authoritarian constitutional 
monarchists, and would go on to install a bloody and chaotic period known as ‘the Terror’ 
under the dictatorship of Maximilien Robespierre for two years. Prior to this, Sieyès in this 
sketch clearly synthesizes his theory of governance, and demonstrates the central tenets of the 
Girondin constitutional project: that the Constitution should protect human rights and was the 
sovereign expression of the people, from which derived all other organs of governance, 
separated into three branches. Further, the legislature should be the central branch from which 
the law would be promulgated, but the other two branches would nevertheless retain equal 
power to check and balance the Parliament. His use of hierarchy and structure in the sketch 
indicate Sieyès’ views on the spatial organisation of the French constitutional arrangements, 
which have inspired a plethora of republican constitutions since, including France’s own Fifth 
Republic, as we will see later in this thesis. It is ironic, as a final note, that Sieyès would go 
onto the participate in the coup which installed Napoleon Bonaparte into power, and helped 
him to draft the 1795 constitution for his French Directory, which prophetically returned the 
executive to the centre of France’s constitutional arrangements, and hints at a struggle between 
that branch and the legislature which the case study of the CCC will make clear in the course 
of this essay.11 
 
 




Figure 2: ‘3 Branches of the U.S. Government’ (USAGov) 
 https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government accessed 17 August 2021 
 
To conclude my exploration of this sketch inspired by a material cultural analysis, Prown 
advises the imaginative speculation of theories and hypotheses one may derive from a given 
object, as ‘speculation is essential to a democracy of ideas’.12 Sieyès’s sketch immediately 
reminded me of when I first learned about the separation of power in my own primary 
education on civics, when I was presented with a diagram showing the 3 branches of 














The similarities between the US government’s own visualisation of its constitutional separation 
of powers and the Sieyès sketch are apparent: both use a hierarchy to establish the constitution 
as what the influential positivist and constitutional jurist Hans Kelsen called the grundnorm, 
or basic norm: the text of a written Constitution, as well as any judicial decision or other 
convention which can be said to have a constitutional or foundational quality, and from which 
 
12 Prown, supra, note 2. 
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flow increasingly specific norms which derive their legitimacy and authority from the ultimate 
law of the grundnorm.13 Interestingly, Sieyès’ sketch seems to align rather well Kelsen’s 
hierarchical pyramid of norms shown below in Figure 3, and this merely serves to illustrate 
that Sieyès’ inspiration from Enlightenment constitutionalism and influence on subsequent 
governance had a substantial influence on the constitutional theory and practice. Of course, I 
do not here mean to suggest that Kelsen necessarily drew direct inspiration from Sieyès; I 
would merely submit that the similarities between their hierarchical conceptions of governance 
indicate perhaps a common influence and closely shared constitutional epistemology. Another 
link between Sieyès and Kelsen is that both were weary of placing the executive in the centre 
position as the ‘guardian of the constitution’, as was advocated for by Kelsen’s academic 
dissident and Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt; however Sieyès’s sketch seems to indicate a preference 












13 Hans Kelsen, ‘Pure Theory of Law’ (1967). 
14 Lars Vinx, ‘The Guardian of the Constitution - Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of 













Figure 3: Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (1967) – illustrated myself from 
description. 
 
My speculation on Sieyès’ sketch is therefore that it represents a consolidation of the 
Enlightenment revolutionary constitutionalism of the US, France and UK, which became the 
standard templates for the majority of governments to follow.15 This drawing nevertheless 
represents assumptions of his own understanding of constitutional spatial division, which he 
translated into his drafting of the Constitution for the First French Republic. The sovereign 
tension between the executive and legislative in the history of French governance that the 
drawing reveals, as well as its use of visual design prototyping methods both serve to introduce 
the themes this thesis will examine, in its exploration of the CCC as a participatory experiment 
sitting somewhere between the French legislative and executive branches itself. At the 
 
15 Günter Frankenberg, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law’ in Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (eds), ‘The 
Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law’ (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
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conclusion of this thesis, I will return to the Sieyès sketch, to reflect on his choice of 
constitutional organisation, and how his design assumptions may have been interrupted by the 
CCC.  
 
This thesis seeks to analyse the actual and potential impact of the recent event of the CCC, an 
iteration of participatory democracy as has not yet been seen in French governance. The first 
part of the essay will explore the context behind the CCC, and thus seeks to answer the 
following research questions: has participatory democracy ever existed in France, and how did 
the CCC fit into the existing French constitutional arrangements? The second part of the thesis 
will seek to argue the actual and potential impact of the CCC on French governance, and therein 
ask whether the CCC had any normative contribution to French law, or whether it threatened 
ordinary French legislative procedure.  
 
My research proposal is important to constitutional thinking because it analyses the actual and 
potential contribution of the French Citizens’ Convention for Climate, and makes the unique 
argument that while it may not have had a large doctrinal impact due to the colonial and 
executive traces of the Fifth Republic, the CCC nonetheless may have re-introduced 
participatory democracy in France through its proposal to institutionalise the idea through 
reform CESE.  
 
This thesis will not be an extensive exploration of the idea participatory democracy in and of 
itself, nor of all of its components: different institutional models, the legitimacy of sortition 
versus election etc., as certain collections have already explored.16 Rather, this thesis is 
 
16 John Gastil & Erik Olin Wright, ‘Legislature by Lot: Transformative Designs for Deliberative Governance’ 
(Verso 2019). 
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intended to be a narrow project on the impact of the CCC itself as a case study within the 
context of the French polity. It will be organised into two parts, as aforementioned, with three 
primary chapters. The first chapter will seek to introduce participatory democracy and French 
governance, so that the second chapter may zoom into the case study of the CCC itself and its 
immediate background. The final, third chapter will elaborate its argument on the actual and 
potential impact of the CCC: that its normative power was limited by its consultative 
constitutional nature under the shadow of a strong French executive, but that the CCC 
nevertheless managed to begin the institutionalisation of participatory democracy in France 
and contribute to empirical research on citizens’ assemblies.  
 
I will draw on various material available on the CCC, such as articles by academics involved 
in the Convention,17 news and media which followed the event, and my own attendance at the 
May 2021 Yale Conference on the Convention ‘Towards Citizen Legislators (Climate Change) 
tomorrow!’, in order to answer the questions on the inception, organisation and approach to 
participation of the CCC. 
 
To explain and explore participatory democracy as situated within the CCC, I will engage 
largely with Professor Hélène Landemore,18 who prior to the Convention was already at the 
forefront of this field, but also was involved in the CCC specifically. I will also draw upon 
research on other models and instances of deliberative democracy, such as by the OECD.19 
 
 
17 Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet, et al.  “Deliberating on Climate Action: Insights from the French Citizens’ 
Convention for Climate”, supra, note 1. 
18 Hélène Landemore, ‘Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First Century’ (Princeton 
University Press, 2020). 
19 OECD, ‘Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave’ 
(2020) OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/339306da-en. 
 18 
In order to discuss the CCC as a constitutional item, I will make use of doctrinal French Law, 
such as the Constitution of the French Republic (1958), and the projet de loi (equivalent to a 
white paper in the UK) which was introduced by the President Macron into the National 
Assembly, following the CCC’s proposals.20 
 
My deconstructive arguments on the traces of the French Constitution will engage in 














20 ‘Projet de loi portant lutte contre le dérèglement climatique et renforcement de la résilience face à ses effets’ 
(Vie publique.fr) <https://www.vie-publique.fr/loi/278460-loi-climat-et-resilience-convention-citoyenne-
climat> accessed 17 August 2021. 
21 Boyron, supra, note 5. 
22 Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergences’, (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11. 
23 Pierre Legrand, ‘Derrida’s Gadamer’ in Glanert S, Girard, Law’s Hermeneutics: Other Investigations 



























Chapter I – Participatory democracy in France 
 
This first chapter will serve as an introduction to the themes and case study I will be analysing 
in this thesis. In the first section, I will present and define ‘participatory democracy’ for my 
purposes as an umbrella term for the interwoven political theories of direct democracy, 
deliberative democracy, sortition and open democracy. In the following section I will elucidate 
France’s current constitutional framework, and in the final section of this chapter I will show 
how participatory democracy emerged within French governance, prior to our case study of the 
CCC.  
 
A) Participatory democracy  
 
‘The people of England regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during 
the election of members of parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes it, and it 
is nothing’.24 So said Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a notable Enlightenment-era political 
philosopher in his famous treatise The Social Contract, which served as a foundation for 
classical republicanism, and inspiration for the revolution against monarchy in the newly 
established United States of America and consequent domino effect of further revolutions for 
democracy in France and other royally-governed polities in the late 18th century.  
 
Democracy, whose Greek etymology means ‘rule of’ (-kratia) ‘the people’ (dēmos), is in its 
contemporary republican form the dominant mode of governance in the world today, favouring 
elections of representatives by the general population to a parliament, to legislate on matters of 
 
24 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘The Social Contract’ (Penguin Books 2004, originally published 1762). 
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the State. Such is the constitution of the United Kingdom, which Rousseau cites in the above 
quote, where Parliament evolved from the Witenagemot, an ancient deliberative assembly of 
freeborn Anglo-Saxon ‘wise-men’, to be considered sovereign.25 Republicanism tames 
democracy, whose pure form could cause a De Tocquevillian ‘tyranny of the majority’26 in a 
utilitarian majority vote, and today both distinct notions are often linked in what is known as 
‘liberal democracy’.27 Therein, the separation of powers into the branches of executive, 
legislative and judiciary, as well as an entrenchment of constitutional rights, serve to protect 
unpopular minorities.28 The people of a polity consent to this arrangement of governance in 
order to form a shared political community, and provide this consent ordinarily in the form of 
elections. Thus is Rousseau’s ‘social contract’: a constitution which ensures the legitimacy of 
the State. It is the study of these social contracts as they live and breathe in given polities which 
forms the basis of the field of Comparative Constitutional Law which will underpin my thesis.29 
 
Rousseau’s quote is indicative of his distrust for the representative democracy that citizen 
electors around the world are accustomed to, as he had a notable preference instead for direct 
democracy. Indeed, the notion of democracy does not require the election of representatives in 
and of itself, but rather is defined by the principle of self-government, which can take many 
forms.30 Direct democracy for example stands in opposition to the idea of representation, and 
instead promotes that the general population vote directly on matters for themselves, such as 
 
25 A. V. Dicey, ‘An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution’ (10th edition, The Macmillan 
Press LTD, 1959). 
26 Alexis De Tocqueville, ‘Democracy In America’ (Penguin Books 2003, originally published 1835). 
27 Chantal Mouffe, ‘The Democratic Paradox’ (Verso Books, 2016). 
28 Montesquieu, ‘The Spirit of the Laws’ (Cambridge University Press 1989, originally published 1748). 
29 Roger Masterman and Robert Schütze (eds), ‘The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Constitutional 
Law’ (Cambridge University Press 2019). 
30 David Held ,‘Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance’ 
(Stanford University Press 1995). 
 22 
by referendum. Rarely, however, is direct democracy seen in its full expression today, as 
contemporary governments will often employ referendums as temporary, and consultative 
instances of direct democracy, rather than as the standard procedure for legislation. To return 
to the British example, a now infamous example is the ‘Brexit’ referendum of the 23rd of June 
2016 in the UK, where a vote outcome of 51.9% found in slim favour of triggering Article 50 
of the Treaty on European Union to withdraw the UK from the EU.31 In any case, this was not 
an instance of pure direct democracy, as the referendum was not normatively binding. It was 
found by the UK Supreme Court in the case of Miller that not only was the Government not 
obliged to follow the outcome of the referendum, but also that it was for Parliament to make 
the final decision, as sovereign.32 This of course resulted nonetheless in the passing of the 
European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, and now the UK is indeed independent 
from the EU, thus showing the impact a referendum still can have, even when not binding. 
However, consultative referendums to another sovereign, even where that sovereign is 
supposedly legitimated by popular election, cannot be said to equate to the ideal of direct 
democracy, in which popular votes would have instant normative power.  
 
Certain constitutions have nevertheless implemented normative, even mandatory, referendums 
for its citizens, such as that of Switzerland, whose tradition of direct democracy inspired the 
Genevan-born Rousseau.33 Switzerland’s Constitution remains in any case only ‘semi-direct’, 
as those provisions are symbiotic with a representative legislative assembly in the polity. 
Rousseau did not believe direct democracy to be feasible at more than a local level, as he 
 
31 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
32 Ibid.  
33 ‘Switzerland 1999 (Rev. 2014) Constitution - Constitute’ 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Switzerland_2014?lang=en accessed 10 August 2021; Articles 
140-141. 
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thought it ‘unimaginable that the people should remain continually assembled to devote their 
time to public affairs’ as the primary form of legislation in a given polity.34 This instead would 
constitute some platonic ideal version of democracy, for Rousseau was convinced that ‘were 
there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. So perfect a government is not 
for men’.35 This dilemma is an archetypal governance debate, which constitutional drafters 
have long considered: how to balance the ultimate (yet logistically impossible) legitimacy of 
every citizen having a direct say in their democratic self-governance, with the need for an 
efficient government comprised of some institutional bureaucracy?36 While we shall see 
towards the end of this thesis that digital technology is easing this dichotomy in ways that 
ancient and Enlightenment constitutional drafters could never have imagined, and may indeed 
allow all people of a polity to have some form of voice in government via digital media, there 
exists yet another age-old compromise solution to the problem: that of the paradigm of 
democratic sortition, falling under the concept of participatory democracy. Indeed, Rousseau 
concluded that ‘the idea of representatives is modern. (…) In the ancient republics, (…) the 
people never had representatives. (…) The moment a people allows itself to be represented, it 
is no longer free: it no longer exists’.37 
 
i. ‘Early democracy’ as distinctly participatory 
 
The origins of democracy are commonly determined to be in Ancient Greece, around the 6th 
century BCE, in the city state polis of Athens, thus explaining its Greek etymology. However, 
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Athenian democracy did not look like democracy’s modern iteration, as formerly illustrated by 
the UK’s bi-cameral Parliament and satellite institutions. Aristotle is well known for writing 
that ‘it is accepted as democratic when public offices are allocated by lot; and as oligarchic 
when they are filled by election’,38 and indeed Athenian democracy is instead thus renowned 
for its use of sortition: the random selection of eligible citizens to participate directly in their 
self-governance. Of course, it must be noted that an Athenian citizen was only a privileged 
adult male having served in the military, and thus excluded slaves, women, children, and any 
resident not born in Athens or to an Athenian citizen – so Athenian democracy, while 
innovative in its means of democratic inclusion, was also hypocritically exclusive. 
 
Terrill Bouricious, who himself served as a local American congressman in Vermont’s House 
of Representatives, explains Athenian democratic sortition as underpinned by the two 
fundamental principles of isonomia and isegoria.39 Isonomia was the right to political equality, 
and signified that all citizens should have the same chance of being chosen by lot serve to in 
public office, and isegoria stood for the right of all citizens to participate in the People’s 
Assembly, and even to initiate legislative proposals. Thus, participatory democracy in Athens 
meant direct contribution to government by citizens through their random selection and ever-
present opportunity to deliberate. The People’s Assembly, or ecclesia, was the equivalent of a 
Parliament in the Athenian Constitution,40 with quasi-executive and judicial powers. This 
Assembly was representative in a sense, as it could only hold 6,000 out of an estimated 30,000 
– 60,000 citizens of the Athenian demos in a given session. However, Bouricious highlights 
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that ‘a council selected by lot was the key institution in Greek democracy and may even have 
been more central to the Greeks’ concept of democracy than the People’s Assembly’.41  
 
The astonishingly republican governance of Athens was thus: a randomly selected Council of 
500 known as the boule would set the legislative agenda, and draft proposed bills. The People’s 
Assembly would vote on these bills, but they would not become law until randomly selected 
Legislative Panels known as the nomethai, comprised of 1,001 citizens over the age of 30, 
approved those bills into law, similar to the UK’s royal assent to Acts of Parliament. Further, 
the judicial branch took the form of the dikasteria, or the People’s courts, where 501, 1,001 or 
1,501 citizens were randomly selected, and had the power to strike down laws passed by the 
People’s Assembly. The Athenian executive was found in small panels of 10 citizens chosen 
by lot, supplemented by the People’s Assembly and the military.42 It is clear then that Athenians 
exercised their popular sovereignty through sortition to all branches of its government, rather 
than via election, which they regarded as ‘inherently aristocratic, since only those with money 
and status could win’.43  
 
This exercise of direct democracy through participation by lot influenced political philosophers 
and comparative constitutionalists from Aristotle to Enlightenment thinkers such as 
Montesquieu and Rousseau, whose writings underpin our contemporary democratic 
constitutions. Examples of it can be seen throughout history, for example in the Renaissance 
Florence which inspired Machiavelli, whose primary organ of governance, the Signoria, also 
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appointed its members through random selection.44 However, while Athenian democracy was 
certainly innovative, and served to inspire future participatory experiments in sortition-
suffused democracy, there is a Western assumption that there was no democracy prior to this 
point in our collective human history.45 The comparative legal theory of legal culturalism 
therein reminds us legal-academics of our situatedness, and our tendency for Eurocentrism in 
comparative constitutional research.46 Instead, it is important to be aware and sensitive to 
traditions of governance around the world, and to have ‘special consideration for local oddities 
and differences of Law and culture’.47 
 
In following this culturalist ethos, David Stasavage emphasises that despite this Western 
conception of Athens as the birthplace of democracy, ‘democratic practices were present in 
many places, at many other times, from the Americas before European conquest, to ancient 
Mesopotamia, to precolonial Africa’.48 Stasavage accordingly bisects democracy in a given 
polity as either ‘early’ or ‘modern’. The former early democracy he identifies first in the 
indigenous societies of southern Africa, where there were no free elections, but tribal leaders 
‘had to rule collectively with assemblies and councils that constrained their actions: the people 
participated in governance’.49 The latter modern democracy is therein distinguished by its 
representative nature, which Stasavage indicates as occurring more frequently, but 
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consequentially is more superficial in terms of participation by the broader populace. 
Therefore, early democracy was distinctively participatory by Stasavage’s definition, and can 
be seen for example in a French Jesuit missionary’s account of the North American indigenous 
Huron tribe’s governance, which was based on ‘both central and local councils with broad 
participation – including for women’, which was ironically more democratic than that Jesuit’s 
own French governance at the time of his writings.50 Stasavage does not discredit Athenian 
democracy, which he nonetheless classifies as perhaps the ‘most extensive example of early 
democracy’ known today,51 but he seeks to post-colonially show that this identifiably 
participatory democracy existed in myriad forms well before Athens, perhaps pointing to some 
human instinct or archetype for democratic self-governance.   
 
India is notable for its rich history of participatory democracy. While we saw that Athenian 
democracy is usually seen as originating in the 6th century BCE, there is evidence that prior to 
this, republics of varying forms ‘flourished at the time of Buddha and Mahavira’ in the Vedic 
period from 1750-500 BCE, or perhaps even earlier in Ancient India.52 For instance, the North-
eastern Indian Licchavis clan was governed by a ghana sangha, or tribal assembly, of 
thousands of people, like the Athenian boule. However, some academics note that those who 
were allowed to participate, similar as to in Athens, had to be from an elite social stratus, such 
as the kshatriyas warrior caste.53 This tradition of early participatory democracy in India 
continues today alongside its modern democracy, as ‘a 1992 constitutional amendment 
entrenched deliberative democratic practices in villages across the country’, to the extent that 
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‘India has the highest deliberative democracy ever, the largest in history of civilisation 
affecting over 800 million people’.54 This constitutional amendment compelled Indian states 
to organise village assemblies known as a gram sabha, with quotas for seats to be filled by 
women and disadvantaged castes, to govern alongside a village legislature, the panchayat.55 
While the gram sabha is criticised as suffering from ‘the problem of rural illiteracy, elite 
domination, and gender bias’, it nevertheless ‘provides a vivid example of how democracy can 
be strengthened through greater citizen involvement’.56 
 
ii. Theories of participatory democracy 
 
I have sought to illustrate that participatory democracy has its origins in early democracy across 
the world, and can be contrasted with modern representative democracy by its prominence in 
the governance of ancient cultures, as well as by its more outright engagement in direct, 
deliberative and lot-driven democracy. More contemporary epistemic origins of Participatory 
democracy in political philosophy begin however with Jürgen Habermas, of the continental 
Frankfurt Critical School, and his elaboration of the public sphere.57 Habermas conceptualised 
deliberation of the people as the ‘heart of the democratic process’, and that this public dialogue 
should occur within the ‘communicative structure’ of what he called the public sphere: an 
abstract ‘social space from where a discursive formation of political opinion can and will 
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emerge’, or ‘the process that will permit the emergence of as many voices as possible, of 
alternatives for action and ways of life, ensuring their right of expression and participation’.58 
The public sphere is one of two ‘deliberative tracks’ Habermas identifies in a given polity’s 
governance as an informal space for public deliberation, with the other being the formal space 
for decision making: the Parliament, courts and administrative government.59  
 
Hélène Landemore, an academic at the forefront of current research on participatory 
democracy, builds her own conception of open democracy on this Habermasian public sphere, 
and explains that its focus on deliberation enriches democracy beyond the dominant ‘one 
person, one vote’ representative paradigm. She defines deliberative democracy as ‘a theory of 
democratic legitimacy that traces the authority of laws and policies to the public exchange of 
arguments among free and equal citizens, rather than, strictly speaking, the moment of voting’, 
and therein re-defines participatory democracy as ‘a political system in which all the members 
are equally entitled to participate in the association’s decisions about its laws and policies, 
including in the pre-voting deliberative stage’.60 For Landemore then, participatory democracy 
requires more direct democracy than simple non-binding referendums, and this is reflected in 
her analysis of Habermas’ public sphere. She explains that while for Habermas the public 
sphere’s deliberations inform the formal track of law-making, they are not substantive or 
directly binding, and thus ‘appear out of sync with modern democratic expectations of more 
immediate participation and voice, particularly as enabled by the digital revolution in almost 
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any other sphere in life’.61 Indeed, as we will see later in this section, the rise of social media 
platforms has been linked to a return of interest to participatory democracy, due to the way the 
political deliberations of the public sphere has become digitalised and therein increasingly 
divisive. 
 
Landemore therefore sees Habermas’ work as fundamental, but not far-reaching enough, and 
so she argues for a public sphere with increased participatory and normative power, to the 
extent it may even replace or at least become equal to the formal decision-making government 
institutions. Taken from Karl Popper’s concept of ‘open society’, Landemore therein proposes 
open democracy: ‘in which the government is not just liberal but genuinely democratic and, 
furthermore, democratic in an “open” manner that facilitates participation of ordinary 
citizens’.62 Under this paradigm, ‘everyone gets a chance to directly exercise legislative power 
– to define the laws that govern ourselves and others’.63 For Landemore, there are five 
fundamental principles which underpin the idea of open democracy: participation rights for all 
citizens in legislation; deliberation as a source of legitimacy and ‘collective wisdom’; majority 
rule where there is no consensus; democratic representation; and finally transparency.64  
 
The fourth principle of Landemore’s open democracy, democratic representation, is 
fundamentally different from representative democracy. Landemore argues that elections are 
characterised by a fear of its own electors, as the founders of our modern enlightenment-era 
governments equivocated ‘pure democracy’ with ‘mob rule’. For example, American 
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constitutional founder James Madison spoke of the need to cure the dangerous passions of 
majority factions in the general populace with representative government by a small group of 
‘enlightened statesmen’, because the people on their own could not be trusted even for direct 
universal suffrage of their President, thus the creation of the US electoral college.65 For 
Landemore, the ‘popular sovereignty’ that representative democracies are built on is only true 
insofar as citizens get to ‘choose their rulers’, but ‘the people never get to actually rule’; instead 
she affirms that ‘democracy, people’s power, is about exercising power, not just consenting to 
it’.66 Landemore further cites the frustrations people feel with their elected representatives, a 
phenomenon that is tied to surely every representative government: that power is given to elites 
by design and disadvantages minorities, as well as that the model does nothing to stimulate 
proper deliberation and informed voting in the Habermasian sense, but rather tends to actively 
suppress it, as can be seen with the notoriously racist Jim Crow laws of the American South.67 
Therein, Landemore hopes for open democracy to decentre electoral institutions, and to shift 
instead towards democratic representation as operating through random selection or self-
selected representation. The idea is similar to the Athenian model previously discussed and 
recalls the concepts of isonomia and isegoria. Landemore’s democratic representation avoids 
our inability to participate as an entire populace at once by advancing lotocratic representation 
in the first instance: ‘representation performed by citizens selected at random or, as a close 
second best in theory and often an improvement in practice, stratified random sampling (which 
allows the targeting of minorities at risk of being underrepresented in a true random sample)’, 
and in the second instance, self-selected representation ‘in “spatially open” assemblies, namely 
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assemblies that are accessible to all those willing to participate’.68 The equal opportunity to 
participate replaces the equal opportunity to vote in this form of democratic representation, and 
justifies the legitimacy of the representative.  
 
Landemore would have her vision of open democracy institutionalised in a lotocratic ‘open 
mini public: a large body of citizens gathered for agenda-setting and law-making’, which would 
be connected to the larger public sphere for ‘deliberative exchange’ and could take the place 
of (or supplement as a 3rd chamber) upper Parliamentary chambers such as senates in 
cohabitation with a representative legislative assembly69. In this thesis, I will be using the term 
‘participatory democracy’ to broadly denote the spectrum of degrees to which citizens 
participate in legislation, with non-normative instance of direct democracy such as referendums 
on the lowest end, Habermas’ deliberative public sphere towards the middle, and Landemore’s 
institutionalised lotocratic open democracy at the top. Therein, participatory democracy as I 
understand and employ it is an umbrella term for direct democracy, deliberative democracy, 
sortition and open democracy. In this thesis, I will be seeking to focus on the idea of 
‘participation’, which is key to all prior concepts in their varying taxonomies.  
 
In the field of Comparative Constitutional Law, research on participatory democracy is still 
slowly gathering momentum, and tends to focus on constitutive assemblies and participatory 
constitution-making, as constitutions are often viewed as the zenith, or culmination of popular 
sovereignty in their normative foundation of the self-governance of ‘we, the people’.70 The 
scholars Sujit Choudhry and Mark Tushnet recently organised a symposium on the 
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phenomenon and describe a recent shift from constitutional drafting by elected delegates, 
legitimated by popular consent and subsequent ratification of their proposed constitution, to a 
‘third wave of democratization (…) with direct, popular participation in the constitution-
making process’.71 Landemore expands on this third participatory wave with an entry on the 
recent Icelandic experiment in a ‘crowd-sourced constitution’, in which she confirms that 
‘public participation in constitution-making is now both an established international norm and 
a widespread practice’, due to a documented sense of legitimacy felt by the constitutive people 
of a polity derived from not just approving their constitution, but participating in its creation.72 
Landemore’s use of the Icelandic example is due to it being a first modern instance of open 
democracy in constitution making, as the ‘Constitutional Council engaged in an iterative 
process of putting twelve successive constitutional drafts online, each time soliciting a new 
round of comments on a text modified in light of the previous round’, thus truly embodying 
the deliberation of the public sphere and tapping into popular collective wisdom, rather than 
treat the people as merely a consulting body.73 Choudhry and Tushnet remark however that the 
increased popularity of participatory democracy does necessarily entail a choice ‘between 
direct and representative democracy, but rather about the role of each in the constitution-
making process, and the interrelationship between the two’, and further that ‘the extent to 
which direct public participation should be increased is an important and, in our view, as yet 
underexplored normative question’.74 Thus it is important to note that constitutional research 
in participatory democracy does not seek to necessarily abolish elections or representative 
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democracies as such, but rather explore how our existing governments are already 
experimenting with participation, and what this could mean for the future.  
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) have recently 
published the first in-depth empirical and comparative study analysing participatory processes 
in governance around the world. 75  Their report overviews participatory democracy as a new 
trend which they call the ‘Deliberative Wave’,  as hundreds of citizens’ conventions have been 
organised within the past decade; precipitating a concerted renaissance of these paradigms in 
ways never before doctrinally implemented.76 The OECD report tracks twelve models of these 
participatory assemblies, but countless examples and research have sprung from the excitement 
for the trend.77 They define participatory democracy as ‘referring to the direct involvement of 
citizens in political decision making, beyond choosing representatives through elections’, and 
further as ‘gaining ground with the activist movements of the 1960s that demanded greater 
participation in government decision making (e.g. civil rights, women’s liberation 
movements)’.78 The OECD also identify four drivers for this deliberative wave: economic 
drivers, as for example the 2020 Edeleman Trust Barometer showed that 83% of people in the 
twenty-eight countries surveyed fear job loss; cultural drivers, in which those ‘left behind’ feel 
under-represented in decision making and reveal an ‘increased division between educated, 
high-earning, pro-migration “globalists” and less educated, poorer, anti-migration “nativists”’; 
political drivers, as only 45% of citizens trust their governments in OECD countries according 
to a 2018 Gallup poll, and people are increasingly dissatisfied with their inability to 
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meaningfully participate in democracy aside from through election or protest; and finally 
technological drivers, where social media exacerbates ‘public opinion fragmentation’.79 In a 
world afflicted in the past years by a global pandemic, climate crisis, and a rise in right-wing 
authoritarian governments, it is not surprising that there is a renewed interest in making 
governance more accessible and participatory in a popular hope of having more say in their 
self-governance in approaching these issues, to replace the distrust in government that is born 
from crises such as these. Thus, the OECD report states that participatory democracy is 
becoming increasingly used ‘in solving some of the most pressing policy challenges’, and that 
there is ‘nowadays a new wave underway towards greater experimentation in their purpose, 
design, combination with other forms of participation, and institutionalisation’. Its authors 
conclude that more comparative research is needed on the paradigm in practice, as participatory 
democracy has ‘the potential to help address some of the key drivers of democratic malaise: 
giving voice and agency to a much wider range of citizens; rebuilding trust in government and 
leading to more legitimate and effective public decision making’.80 
 
Of the twelve broad models of participatory democracy outlined, the OECD report for example 
introduces ‘Citizens’ Juries’: ‘focused processes to advise on a specific policy issue, typically 
at sub-national level’, and the ‘G1000’ or ‘Citizens’ Council’ models for regional use, and to 
‘address less complex community problems’.81 However, in this thesis, we will be focussing 
on one particular model of participatory democracy, that of the ‘Citizens’ Assembly’: 
‘considered as the most robust and elaborate model of representative deliberative processes  
(…) the first Citizens’ Assembly was organised in response to the need to create a platform 
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where ordinary citizens, rather than political elites (who may have been influenced by party 
loyalties), could contribute to the design of a new electoral system for British Columbia’, and 
‘have been mostly used to address questions to do with institutional setup and constitutional 
changes’.82 The most well-known recent example was the Irish Citizens’ Assembly (2016-
2018), which tackled amongst others the politically divisive issues of same-sex marriage and 
abortion, and historically resulted in constitutional reform to legalise both, as well as provoked 
the government to declare a climate emergency.83 
 
This thesis focusses on the CCC, also a citizens’ assembly, which occurred between 2019 and 
2020 in France, in response to the ‘Yellow Vests’ movement and the ‘Grand National Debate’. 
The French researchers who followed the French Climate Convention and even helped to 
organise it, define citizens’ assemblies as ‘a specific form of deliberative mini-public, one 
involving a critical number of representative participants and lasting long enough for 
participants to produce readily implementable policies’, and that they are ‘meant to both feed 
into and complement representative democracy in an attempt to overcome stalemates on issues 
such as family policy and climate action (…) and submit policy proposals to government 
executives or elected authorities’.84 We will thus see that the CCC is thus a unique instance of 
participatory democracy in France.  
 
Those researchers conclude in their report on the CCC that ‘citizens’ assemblies offer unique 
opportunities for social scientists to collect research material to begin to answer questions’ such 
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as ‘what is the legitimacy of a mini-public in participating in decisions involving a broader 
public? How does the framing of deliberation shape its outcomes? Do such assemblies produce 
sound proposals that are more acceptable to the population? Do they put traditional policy-
making at risk?’.85 Indeed, a common critique of participatory democracy is that ‘many of the 
assumptions of proponents of participation remain untested, and the precise relationships 
between participation and desirable outcomes of interest remain underspecified. (…) Scholars 
have been far better at generating hypotheses than testing them’.86 Indeed, my thesis will seek 
to show that if nothing else, the value of research on the CCC serves to add to the ‘limited data’ 
on and ‘conceptual refinement’ of participatory democracy,87 which has seldom been 
implemented in modern governance to the extent seen in early democracies, until the recent 
deliberative wave indicated a new trend and possible paradigm shift in future. 
 
B) France’s current constitutional framework and legislative procedure 
 
Leading on from the last section which introduced participatory democracy, this section will 
now provide an overview of the other crucial context in which our case study of the CCC is 
situated: the polity of France and its current constitutional arrangements. France has been in its 
Fifth Republic since its most recent Constitution was passed in 1958, though it is nevertheless 
built on the foundations of the Republics which came before it, right back through to its 
republican inception following the French Revolution.88 Indeed, the Preamble of the French 
Constitution reads: ‘the French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man 
 
85 Ibid.  
86 Ginsburg, Blount & Elkins, supra, note 70.  
87 Ibid.  
88 ‘France 1958 (Rev. 2008) Constitution - Constitute’ 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008?lang=en> accessed 18 August 202. 
 38 
and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789’,89 with the 
Preamble being determined by a judgment of the Constitutional Council to have equal 
normative power as the rest of the constitutional articles.90 The Constitution then goes on to 
list what France’s cultural identity is best known for: its language is French; its national 
emblem is the blue, white and red tricolour flag; the French national anthem is La Marseillaise; 
and its maxim is ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’; though perhaps surprisingly, there is no 
mention of cheese or wine in this section (perhaps a French tradition more than a constitutional 
norm).91 France’s First Republic, which we saw in the introduction was based on Abbé Sieyès’ 
republican vision and the Enlightenment political trends of the time, established the polity as 
an archetypal liberal democracy, with three separate branches of judiciary, executive and 
legislature all sharing power conferred onto them by the sovereign people – and so after a 
turbulent history, France’s current Fifth Republic reiterates and amplifies those principles, 
though not without its share of controversy as we will see, for the division of power is not 
necessarily proportionate between the branches, but rather skewed towards the executive. 
Further, France cannot be characterised as an outright participatory democracy akin to ancient 
Athens, though the next section will go on to show that traces of participation nevertheless can 
be found in France’s constitutional history. Rather, France is most-often characterised as 
having a representative, semi-presidential republican constitution.92 
 
We will see that France’s executive takes the form of the President, with this office currently 
held by Emmanuel Macron since 2017. The codified legal system in France is also notably part 
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of the civil law tradition,93 presided over by an inquisitorial judicial system, whose supreme 
courts are divided into the Council of State for administrative cases, the Constitutional Council 
for public law cases, and the Court of Cassation for appeals in all other areas of law. For the 
purposes of this thesis however, we will be interested in the legislative procedure more so than 
the judicial interpretation of those laws once promulgated, as we will see that the mandate of 
the dissertation’s case study, the CCC, was to draft legislative proposals for the government to 
introduce into the French Parliament.  
 
The French Parliament is bi-cameral, meaning it consists of two chambers which are meant to 
keep each other in check, and prevent a despotic majority from forming. Unlike in the UK and 
US however, the two French chambers are not adjacent to each other in a single building. The 
lower chamber called the National Assembly meets in the Bourbon Palace and consists of 577 
deputies elected by direct suffrage in each constituent department of France, with a term of 5 
years.94 Famously, the National Assembly takes the form of a hemisphere in keeping with a 
tradition established by the first National Assembly of the French Revolution, in which left 
wing parties took their seats on the left of the hemisphere while right wing parties sat on its 
right side, therein originating the taxonomy of the political spectrum of ‘left-right’ in common 
use today.95 The upper chamber of the French Parliament meets in the Luxembourg Palace, 
and consists of 348 senators elected by indirect suffrage by an electoral college of sorts, to a 
term of six years.96 Rarely, the President makes a speech to both houses together in what is 
known as the Congress of the French Parliament, where both houses forming the Parliament in 
 
93 Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’, supra, note 46. 
94 France 1958 (Rev. 2008) Constitution, supra, note 88, Title IV Art 24. 
95 Andrew Heywood, ‘Political Ideologies: An Introduction’ (Macmillan International Higher Education 6th ed. 
2017) p14–17. 
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its entirety meet in Versailles Palace, the historical court of the French Kings of old, and 
sometimes discuss constitutional reform.97 None of these aristocratic palaces however are open 
to the public, and so it is not surprising that the Parliament is viewed by many in the French 
public as untrustworthy, especially with the Senate not being open to direct suffrage; we shall 
see that this feeling of illegitimacy culminated in the Yellow Vests protests over a ‘lack of faith 
in the institutions of representative democracy’.98 
 
The legislative procedure in the French Parliament is analogous to many other polities with 
representative democracies. Any Member of Parliament has the constitutional right to initiate 
legislation in either chamber.99 There are many types of law, but this thesis will focus on 
ordinary and organic laws. An ordinary law is, as its name gives away, any simple statute 
passed by Parliament and normatively subordinate to constitutional laws.100 Any such ordinary 
law must be examined and approved by both houses of Parliament on the same terms, but it 
usually begins in one house under the inspection of a smaller relevant Parliamentary 
commission, who may propose amendments.101 To be adopted, the ordinary law must be voted 
by a majority in both houses, but any proposed amendment in either house during this process 
sends the law back and forth between the houses in what is known as the ‘Parliamentary 
shuttle’, before finally becoming a law when promulgated by the French President within 
fifteen days of its adoption by Parliament, in which time the law can be sent back for 
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modification by the executive, or passed onto the judiciary’s Constitutional Council for 
verification against the Constitution itself.102 The law is considered in force when it is 
published in the Official Journal.103  
 
Organic laws on the other hand concern any ‘organ of the state’, and are used to complement 
provisions of the Constitution.104 Organic laws are legislated in the same fashion as ordinary 
laws, except for certain special procedures such as that Parliament must wait fifteen days before 
it can debate the bill, to allow its Members time to understand the proposed bill and consult 
with constituency they represent; and further, organic laws require an absolute majority in the 
National Assembly to be passed, as well as the mandatory approval by the Constitutional 
Council.105 
 
i. A deconstructive analysis of France’s ‘invisible constitution’  
 
In order to truly understand France’s constitutional organisation, however, for the purposes of 
this thesis, one must look beyond the mere text of the Constitution, and onward to its history, 
and its functioning in practice. Boyron so warns that ‘the Fifth republic created by the 1958 
constitution is on paper quite different from the regime firmly established in practice’.106 
France’s Constitution, like all constitutions, is a living constitution, shaped by its society’s 
evolving culture, identity, traditions, and unwritten norms which cannot ever be fully captured 
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by a codified constitution. A metaphor of an ‘invisible constitution’ encapsulates this 
phenomenon, and all of the aforementioned which lie beyond the written constitutional 
document.107  
 
To begin to uncover France’s invisible constitution, I will employ French post-structuralist 
philosopher Jacques Derrida’s idea of deconstruction in order to reveal an enduring 
colonialism, as well as a surprising supremacy of the executive within France’s constitutional 
arrangements, which would not be apparent from a doctrinal reading of the text of the 
Constitution alone.108 Usually applied in the field of philosophical hermeneutics to the 
interpretation of texts, Pierre Legrand co-opted this methodology into the study of comparative 
law and legal texts, which through a Derridean analysis are composed of their visible graphic 
dimensions (words on a paper), and equally important, though under-appreciated; invisible yet 
present ‘traces’: the historical, sociological, cultural, traditional, economical etc. circumstances 
that a text was written under, and from which it can never be detached.109 For Derrida, this 
textuality, as he calls it, has a ‘spectral’ or ghost-like quality, in that the invisible traces will 
indefinitely haunt a given (law-as-)text; and further, traces have their own traces ad infinitum, 
to the extent that the entirety of existence preceding the creation of a given text can be 
considered to have deterministically, or causally, led to that text’s creation, so that there is truly 
nothing that can be said to lie beyond a text.110  
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To deconstruct a text is then to recognise its textuality and seek to reveal its invisible traces, so 
Legrand grounds this abstract methodology with a deconstruction of the controversial French 
statute banning religious dress at school,111 to explain that beyond its graphic words the statute 
is haunted by traces of ‘the history of the relationship between churches and state as it has 
developed in France since the early fourteenth century; by nineteenth-century French colonial 
politics in North Africa; by a contemporary conception of  “Republican citizenship” prohibiting 
the idea of minority rights; and by an epistemological distinction between the “public” and the 
“private” harking back to Roman law’.112 Legrand goes further to show that these traces can 
themselves be infinitely traced to other traces: ‘while the text of the statute can be traced to the 
French political unwillingness to recognize minority rights, that unwillingness can be traced to 
the political philosophy of Rousseau (…) which can itself be traced to Sparta, which he adopted 
as model’.113 Derrida thus neologised this phenomenon as the différance of texts: that they are 
‘infinitely-deferred’ by the traces which haunt them, and ‘ever-different’ depending on the 
interpreter’s own subjective understanding of a text. In this ‘double bind’, Derrida warns that 
one can never presume to discover the ‘true’ meaning of a text, and so agrees Legrand for legal 
texts.114 With this in mind, I concede that my arguments in this thesis will inevitably be 
restricted to my own interpretation of the French Constitution, and the CCC’s impact on it. 
Nonetheless, I submit that a deconstructive analysis will allow me to argue that France’s 
invisible constitution has an implicit influence on its current events, such as the CCC.  
 
 
111 Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de 
tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics. 
112 Legrand, ‘Siting Foreign Law: How Derrida Can Help’, supra, note 109. 
113 Ibid.  
114 Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 111. 
 44 
As we have seen, the French 1958 Constitution is ‘iterative’, or ‘palimpsestic’,115 to use 
Derridean terms,116 of the fourteen constitutions and four republics which preceded it, not to 
mention the occasional empire and brief constitutional monarchy in France’s tumultuous 
history. To uncover its invisible constitution is to deconstruct its traces, which Derrida 
romantically described as ‘death strolling between the letters’;117 an appropriate metaphor here, 
due to the historical bloodshed which lead to the establishment of the Fifth Republic. We 
briefly outlined in the introduction the Revolutionary roots of representative democracy in 
France, and Boyron further explains that the subsequent period of the Terror, infamous for its 
bloody brutality and chaotically arbitrary killings under the dictatorship of Robespierre and his 
ironically named ‘Committee of Public Safety’, began when King Louis XVI was famously 
executed for treason by guillotine, launching France into ‘political instability for the next 200 
years’.118 However, once Robespierre in turn was himself executed for treason, a new 
constitution in 1795 created a government known as the ‘Directory’, which ‘turned away from 
the idea of popular democracy’, and ‘for the first time, the Parliament was divided into two 
chambers, the Conseil des Cinq-Cents (Council of the 500) and the Conseil des Anciens 
(Council of the Ancients)’.119 This was the beginning of representative democracy as we know 
it in France.  
 
 
115 Derived from the noun ‘palimpsest’: a ‘writing material (such as a parchment or tablet) used one or more 
times after earlier writing has been erased’ - ‘Definition of Palimpsest’ https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/palimpsest accessed 25 August 2021. 
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The Directory came to an end when Napoleon Bonaparte seized power in a coup d’état, from 
whence the term originates,120 at the dusk of the 18th century, and declared himself as Emperor 
of the French Empire in 1804. We will shortly see that the Fifth Republic has a notably strong 
executive, and the traces of this can thus be found in Napoleon’s ‘establishing of a caesarean 
tradition, which has appeared at regular intervals in France’; legally re-enforced by the Abbé 
Sieyès and architect of France’s first Civil Code, Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis, who drafted  the 
constitutions of Napoleon’s Consulate and subsequent Empire ‘so as to establish the supremacy 
of the executive over the legislature’.121 Napoleon’s regime was very influential on the current 
French legal system in myriad ways, but for the purposes of this thesis, I will only further point 
out that the Council of State can also be traced back to this time, in which it assisted the 
executive by ‘drafting legislative proposals and resolving administrative disputes’.122 This 
trace haunting France’s current constitution can itself be traced back to the Roman Republic’s 
elected magistrate with emergency powers: the dictator,123 which Julius Caesar infamously 
extended into the Roman Empire and so inspired Napoleon, who ‘believed in a strong executive 
legitimised by popular support’.124 
 
In this section, I am seeking to demonstrate that an understanding of the history of current 
French governance through traces left on its invisible constitution clarifies why our case study 
of the CCC is bound by the French traditions of supreme executive power, and as we will now 
see, colonialism. The final trace haunting the Fifth Republic I will therein uncover is its origin 
in the Algerian War of Independence. To understand this, we must travel back in time to the 
 
120 The first known printed use of ‘coup d’état’ in English was in Canterbury’s Kentish Gazette (October 16th, 
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Second World War, when France fell to Nazi Germany’s invasion and created a collaborating 
‘Vichy’ government lead by the decorated First World War hero, Maréchal Pétain, who worked 
with the Nazis to round up French Jews and send them onto concentration camps, such as in 
the deplorable ‘Vel' d'Hiv' Roundup’.125 During this time, the General Charles De Gaulle was 
exiled in London, leading the French Resistance, and eventually taking over as wartime 
executive of the French government after helping to liberate France in 1945, until a new 
peacetime 4th Republic was established in 1946.126 This new constitution is remembered largely 
for its instability, and ‘impotent Parliament’, which so often dissolved governments through 
votes of no confidence that over the course of twelve years, there were twenty-one total 
governments in the 4th Republic.127 During this period, decolonisation had begun around the 
world, and Algeria was one of France’s principal colonies, ‘regarded administratively and 
territorially as part of France, and a large French population lived there’, until it too began to 
seek independence, and the ensuing crisis marked the end of the 4th republic.128  
 
De Gaulle, who had ‘saved the republic’ in a time of grave crisis from Nazi occupation, was 
seen as a hero and implored to come out of retirement to lead the nation out of the Algerian 
crisis, to the extent that at that time, French ‘political power was divided between the 
constitutional power of the Government in Paris, the factual power of the committee of national 
security in Algiers, and the moral power of de Gaulle’.129 De Gaulle would only return to 
politics under a new constitution, and so the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was endorsed 
by a majority of 82.6% of the French people (with 98.9% voter turnout) in a referendum in 
 
125 Robert Marrus, ‘Vichy France and the Jews’ (Stanford University Press, 1995). 
126 Boyron, supra, note 5, p17. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Robert Aldrich, ‘Vestiges of the Colonial Empire in France: Monuments, Museums and Colonial 
Memories’ (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 
129 Boyron, supra, note 5, p18.  
 47 
1958 which ‘allowed the expression of the sovereign, the French Nation, and was the most 
complete seal of legitimacy that could be given’ to the new social contract.130 As we will see, 
De Gaulle as first President of the Fifth Republic left a strong executive imprint on the 
Constitution as it functions today, and would go on to seek emergency powers to suppress the 
Algerian War of Independence, although he was eventually forced to concede to a ceasefire 
and grant this independence in the 1962 Evian Accords, nevertheless steeping the Fifth 
Republic in colonial beginnings.131 
 
It is important to read the French Constitution in a postcolonial light to properly deconstruct 
its imperial traces, not only within the Fifth Republic’s origins amidst the arduous and 
begrudging decolonization of Algeria, but also to understand France’s continuing colonialism 
in those territories which have yet to gain their independence.132 The first article of France’s 
1958 Constitution lists the characteristics of the French Fifth Republic, notably as a ‘unitary’ 
state (as opposed to devolved) due to the indivisibility of its national sovereignty.133 However, 
this attempt to homogenise the French State in spite of its overseas territories, colonies in 
everything but name, entails that ‘territorially (…) a federal organisation would be 
unconstitutional and that territorial entities can never be granted complete autonomy’.134  
 
France has thirteen overseas territories in its Republic, categorised as ‘DOM-TOM’ (overseas 
department or territory), with an estimated total population of close to 2,785,000 people as of 
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January 2021, accounting for about 4% of the total French population.135 Just as the ‘great 
compromise’ of the American two houses of Congress, the French Parliament equally allotted 
the lower house of the National Assembly to represent the population, and the upper house of 
the Senate to represent the territories (and socio-economic actors), and while the people of 
France’s overseas territories are considered French and given proportionate representation in 
Parliament, this representative democracy does not stretch to suffrage or choice of their local 
executive.136 William Miles writes on the DOM-TOM, that ‘the vast majority of their 
inhabitants are of West Indian, East Indian, African, and Oceanic ethnicity’, and the political, 
ideological, and moral issues that DOM-TOM politics pose to post-colonial democratization’ 
are often ignored.137 Therein, the indivisibility of the French state means that these overseas 
territories cannot choose to become independent, at least not without war as Algeria was forced 
to go through with, and further, the population are governed by a minister chosen by the central 
French Government. Miles illustrates this situation by explaining that ‘Guadeloupeans can thus 
cast ballots for Jacques Chirac or Lionel Jospin; but they cannot vote for the one person they 
wish to govern their island. Nor have they the collective right to popular self- determination -
to choose between remaining part of France or creating a sovereign Guadeloupean state’, only 
for Miles to denounce these constitutional arrangements as a ‘sham and (…) alien power’s 
democracy, built on a history of colonial rule’.138  
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These traces of France’s colonial history can be themselves traced back even before its first 
Republic, as can be seen with the example of Haiti. A reprehensible decree called the ‘Black 
Code’ ratified by King Louis XIV in 1685 set out the legality of slavery in the French colonial 
empire, which in Haiti, then called Saint-Domingue, created ‘one of the largest and most 
brutally efficient slave colonies’.139 In 1791, inspired by the French revolution and its 
championing of human rights, Haiti launched its own revolution against France, and won its 
independence from Napoleon in 1804.140 However, while Haiti was still a colony in the French 
empire, its ‘celebrated revolutionary general’ Toussaint L’Ouverture organised a 
Constitutional Assembly, with representatives elected from all of then Saint-Domingue’s 
departments, to draft a Constitution for Haiti in 1801. Parallels have been drawn between the 
French revolutionary Jacobins drafters of the first French Republic (of which the Abbé Sieyès 
was considered one until he joined the subsequent Girondin faction), and the ‘Black Jacobins’ 
of Haiti, who applied the Enlightenment values praised by the French Jacobins to a more honest 
and radical extent.141 For example, the Haitian Constitution of 1801 was revolutionary in its 
own right, in that it abolished slavery,142 a feat that the United States only comparatively 
accomplished after a long civil war sixty-four years later, with its Constitutional 13th 
Amendment.143 In fact, Thomas Jefferson, who was the American President at the time of 
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Haiti’s early constitutional abolition of slavery, and author of the 1776 Declaration of 
Independence’s famous assertion that ‘all men are created equal’, refused to recognise Haiti as 
a new republic for fear of the potential impact it could inspire in the US slave states.144 In 
France, the Jacobins were also hypocritically silent on the abolition of slavery, and colonialism 
in the French colonies.145 While slavery had been abolished in France in 1794, it was re-instated 
by Napoleon in 1802, and would not be definitively abolished once more until 1848, making it 
so that the ‘Black Code’ remained in force for a disgraceful 163 years, all the way through the 
French Revolution and up to its 2nd Republic.146 
 
Boyron forewarned that ‘French Constitutional law has been tainted by these difficult 
beginnings’, of bloody Revolution, Terror, Empire, and colonial hegemony. France’s 
imperialist history, from slavery in Haiti to desperately seeking to suppress Algerian 
independence by creating a whole new Fifth Republic (which continues to deny autonomy to 
its overseas territories), evidences traces of a muted and oppressed subaltern in the shadow of 
the French Constitution, which we will see continues to haunt its contemporary endeavours in 
our case study of the CCC.147 This deconstructive exercise, I submit, sets the foundation for an 
understanding of the invisible French Constitution’s notably strong executive and centralised 
bureaucratic administration, in contrast with a relatively weak Parliament. I have sought to 
deconstruct the text of the French Constitution by emphasising its textuality, and seeking to 
reveal certain of its infinite invisible traces: two joint traditions of colonialism and strong 
leadership in the polity linked by their mutually Leviathan-esque hegemony, which have 
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persisted throughout the history of France before, during and after its famous 1789 Revolution 
up to this day as we will see in the next section, despite the democratic symbol of ‘liberty, 
equality and fraternity’ that that Revolution has become. For the purpose of this thesis and our 
case study, this deconstructive exercise will be useful in supporting my argument that 
participatory democracy is not so easily introduced, and cannot flourish, in such presidential 
governance under a colonial constitution.  
 
ii. The sovereignty of the French President 
 
The beginning of this section briefly overviewed the legislative procedure in the French 
Parliament, but what the text of the Constitution does not necessarily reveal of its own volition 
is the extent to which the Fifth Republic has become dominated by a caesarean President. We 
discussed how the preceding 4th Republic had attempted a Parliamentary Sovereignty, a 
‘souveraineté de la loi’, inspired by the UK’s Westminster system, but its legacy was political 
instability, and so Boyron describes the Fifth Republic as the ‘end of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty in France’.148 The new Constitution requested by De Gaulle was written to ensure 
that the government could function even in coalition or minority Parliament, and so legislative 
power was split in the Fifth Republic between the legislative branch, who could make laws on 
taxes, criminal procedure and other standard subjects for statutes;149 and the executive who was 
granted a wider jurisdiction and broad normative power to legislate everything else not 
delegated to Parliament,150 reminiscent of the American constitutional provision that ‘all 
(legislative) powers not delegated to (the federal government) are reserved to the states’.151 
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This was done to ‘facilitate the speed and efficiency of the business of government’, and so the 
government has therein found it very easy to pass legislation through Parliament under these 
constitutional provisions, for any Parliamentary refusal is threatened by the ever-present 
possibility of the President simply by-passing the Parliament and resorting to its own 
autonomous legislative power.152 Further, while we have seen that Members of Parliament have 
the right to initiate legislation, Article 39 of the Constitution also grants this power to the Prime 
Minister of France in the executive branch;153 and in practice, the French Government 
introduces 90% of bills, or ‘legislative projects’ (akin the UK white papers), to the Parliament, 
while only an estimated 10% of those legislative projects will survive the legislative procedure 
to be enacted.154 Beyond the legislative procedure, these laws once passed remain abstract, as 
is standard practice in the drafting of legislation, and require implementation by Government 
decrees in order to be contextualised and enforced.155 
 
From the outset then, the text of the Fifth Republic’s Constitution granted primacy to the 
executive, with the President and Government listed as the 2nd and 3rd titles respectively in the 
Constitution before Parliament is even mentioned.156 The President under this section has the 
usual powers polities tend to grant them, such as being the head of the army and foreign affairs, 
as well as the power to dissolve the lower house of Parliament (in this case the National 
Assembly).157 The President can appoint any military and civil service positions in their 
Government,158 and they also benefit from what is known as a ‘majority phenomenon’ unique 
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to France, in the National Assembly. While this benefit is not strictly codified, it has arisen out 
of tradition, and in 2000, the Presidential term was amended to be reduced from seven to five 
years, precisely in order avoid a cohabitation of opposing parties in the National Assembly, 
which has only happened three times in the Fifth Republic’s history, and which arose when the 
President has appointed an opposition leader as Prime Minister rather than resign in the rare 
occasions that they lost their Parliamentary majority.159 This majority phenomenon means in 
practice that any legislative bill a President seeks to introduce to Parliament is almost 
guaranteed to pass.  
 
De Gaulle in a sense reincarnated King Louis XIV’s ‘I am the State’, with his belief in a strong 
executive which he said should ‘embody the spirit of the nation’, and in fact Boyron points out 
that ‘executive’ is almost a misnomer, as the President does more than just enforce the law, but 
in France actually has the normative power to initiate legislation and ‘drive decision 
making’.160 De Gaulle approached the Presidency from the perspective of a war-time leader, 
revered as a mythical hero by his people, and so by his sheer cultural influence on France was 
able to ‘imprint his own interpretation on the Constitution’ of the Fifth Republic even after he 
had passed.161 For example, the Constitution was drafted in deference to the UK system, in 
which the Prime Minister would head the Government under the symbolic, but not normative, 
power of the President who would act only as Head of State (akin to the Queen of England), 
and this why the Prime Minister, and not the President, was granted the power to initiate 
legislation in conjunction with Members of Parliament.162 However, when De Gaulle arrived 
into the office of President, he interpreted the Constitution to allow him to choose his own 
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Prime Minister, who would report to him, more alike the American dynamic of President and 
Vice-President.163 To legitimate this strong Presidency, De Gaulle used ‘referendums to gain 
popular legitimacy and to have a direct dialogue with the French people’, and so organised four 
such referendums during his two terms in office, staking his authority on the outcome and 
promising to resign if they did not go in his favour, which ultimately is how he ended up leaving 
office after the French people rejected his proposal in a 1969 referendum, and he passed away 
shortly after, though not without leaving the normative legacy of an authoritarian French leader 
behind.164 In this same vein of seeking legitimacy, one of these referendums aimed to reform 
the Constitution to allow for direct universal suffrage of the President, yet De Gaulle ironically 
did so by by-passing the ordinary constitutional amendment procedure which would have 
required Parliamentary approval, and rather used his own Presidential power to organise 
referendums, which did not explicitly allow for constitutional reform, and thus further 
increased the supremacy of the executive.165  
 
Earlier, I demonstrated that the Fifth Republic was born amidst the French attempt to 
consolidate its colonial sovereignty over a rebelling Algeria seeking independence. De Gaulle 
used this ‘crisis’, as all executives historically have from Caesar to Hitler in the more extreme 
well-known cases, to seek emergency powers, and so his interpretation of a Constitution which 
he had requested meant that De Gaulle was able to create certain Presidential prerogatives and 
decision-making powers for himself that were not explicitly written in the constitutional text.166 
For instance, the Constitution provided for emergency powers in case of ‘war, disaster, nuclear 
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accident’ etc. and so granted the executive (intended once again to be the Prime Minister) to 
act by whatever means ‘in order to restore the continuity of the political system’.167 However, 
in 1961 towards the end of the Algerian Independence War, four Algerian generals had 
attempted a coup, and De Gaulle activated these emergency powers in response, though while 
the coup had ended three days later, De Gaulle held onto the emergency powers for five 
months, and took twenty-six decisions based on them unrelated to Algeria, without allowing 
for Parliamentary debate; thus seizing a ‘constitutional dictatorship’ justified by colonial 
ends.168 In addition to the Presidential stranglehold over the French Constitution, there is very 
little accountability or political responsibility for the President, and no real impeachment 
process provided for in the Fifth Republic, as the only accountability mechanisms are a 
parliamentary vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, who was intended to be the de facto 
leader of the executive.169  
 
I have sought to elucidate then that the President of France under the Fifth Republic has an 
unusually large monopoly over the legislative procedure and governance of the polity. Despite 
the Constitution being newly drafted in the 20th century, De Gaulle was able to resurrect the 
monarchic traces of certain executive prerogatives from the kings and emperors of France’s 
past, comparable to those resilient prerogative which remain available to the UK’s executive, 
and which President Macron nonetheless retains today.170 Similar to the Unitary Executive 
Theory, which interprets the vague American Constitution as granting almost unlimited 
authority to the President, the French executive’s power derives more from an interpretation 
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that has evolved to become an invisible, yet equally normative, constitution, rather than from 
the written text of Constitution itself.171 The parallel continues in the role of the judiciary, 
which historically in the UK, US and France has slowly risen through centuries of increasingly 
adamant jurisprudence from superficial institution to the final assessor of the constitutionality 
of a statute, in spite of the legislative or executive sovereignty in either polity.172 However, it 
is worth highlighting here that the Constitutional Council in France is criticised for its provision 
that any past President can for life serve as an ad hoc judge of the Council ex officio whenever 
they see fit by virtue of their supposed ‘expertise of the Constitution’, to the extent that a former 
President is able to show up un-announced and increase the amount of judges sitting on a given 
case, which may very well be questioning the constitutionality of a law or decree that that 
former President had issued in their term.173 The controversy around former President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, who only retired from the Constitutional Council after the court was set to hear a case 
on Sarkozy’s illegal use of campaign funds, shows that the President legally retains the 
discretion on whether to recuse themselves or not from the supreme constitutional court.174 
Nevertheless, while the Constitutional Council retains some authority against the President in 
France, and the French people are constitutionally deemed as sovereign, a Schmittian reading 
of the Fifth Republic determines that the ‘sovereign is he who decides the exception’, and I 
have so argued in this section that the executive remains the constitutional body able to 
unilaterally legislate, enforce laws, seize emergency powers, even act as constitutional judge 
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once retired, and give a voice to the people only when it so chooses by referendum.175 The 
French President decides the exception, and so is sovereign. 
 
To conclude this section, I will now introduce two constitutional bodies which act as 
consultants, or advisers to the executive. The first is the Council of State, which we have seen 
originated under Napoleon’s rule. In the Fifth Republic, the Council of State has evolved to 
hold two functions which are paradoxical to the principle of the separation of powers. The first 
is its role as Supreme Administrative Court for administrative issues, yet this is criticised as 
creating a conflict of interest with its second role, which is as the Government legal advisor, 
akin to the US Solicitor General.176 The legislative procedure established at the beginning of 
this section is really informed by what happens behind the curtain, before a bill is introduced 
into Parliament. The real beginning of the procedure is when the President decides to initiate a 
law, either of their own volition or on the advice of some subservient actor in the executive, 
for example the Council of State can itself suggest legislative reform to the Government of its 
own initiative. The President then has a legislative project written up, and must subsequently 
consult the Council of State on this bill, who highlights any incompatibility between it and the 
Constitution or other law, checks the quality of the drafting as well as the merits justifying the 
need for a new law; and even re-drafts a bill accordingly if necessary.177 The President however 
reserves the discretion to accept the Council of State’s advice, or simply to keep its originally 
drafted legislative project.178 It is therein constitutionally counterintuitive that the same 
institution of the Council of State who advises and even drafts on Government legislative 
projects, should then be the final court of appeal for any administrative legal issues deriving 
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from such laws, furthering my argument that the executive has a hand in every constitutional 
pocket.179 It should not be surprising then that, once returned from the Council of State either 
amended or not, a legislative project must then be adopted by a Council of Ministers within the 
Government, which the President not only chairs, but also to which they appoint members.180 
Once the proposed bill has gone through the bureaucratic, yet superficial, requirements of 
approval by the Council of State and Council of Ministers, it can then be introduced into either 
chamber of Parliament, and then once approved by the legislature is returned to the President 
to promulgate the bill into law.  
 
Finally, there exists a third, lesser-known assembly in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic 
which complements the two assemblies of Parliament but is situated under the authority of the 
executive. This constitutional body is the Economic, Social and Environmental Council 
(abbreviated as the CESE in French): a consultative body representing civil society with its 
members chosen by professional organisations,181 which advises on all programming laws 
(laws which determine government programmes).182 The CESE can be consulted by the 
Government or Parliament on any social, economic or environmental issue, and also receives 
citizens’ petitions.183 The most recent iteration of this constitutional assembly stems from the 
‘The Constitutional law on the Modernisation of the Institutions of the Fifth Republic’ enacted 
in 2008, which notably integrated the body’s jurisdiction over issues concerning the 
 
179 Dominique Rousseau « Pour déconfiner la France politiquement, il faut reconnaître la compétence des 
citoyens »’ Le Monde.fr (23 June 2020) <https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/06/23/dominique-rousseau-
pour-deconfiner-la-france-politiquement-il-faut-reconnaitrela-competence-des-citoyens_6043817_3232.html> 
accessed 5 August 2021. 
180 France 1958 (Rev. 2008) Constitution, supra, note 88, Art 9-13. 
181 Ibid. Art 71. 
182 Ibid. Art 34, Section 6.  
183 Ibid, Art 69, Section 2.  
 59 
environment.184 We will see that our case study of the CCC was organised under the auspices 
of the CESE, and that President Macron intended for the ‘CCC to serve as an experiment for a 
reform of the CESE that would open the institution to the general public or to enable further 
mini-publics’.185  
 
C) Was there ever participatory democracy in France? 
 
Now that I have introduced both participatory democracy and France’s constitutional 
arrangements, I will be able to situate the CCC as an instance of the former, which occurred in 
the latter. However, in this final section of the first chapter, I would like to first explore whether 
there have ever been any instances of participatory democracy in French governance before.  
 
We have seen that French constitutionalism is distinctly presidential, centralised, and 
bureaucratic, and so it is to be expected that the polity does not have a rich history with 
participatory democracy, at least not to the extent which we have observed in ancient Athens 
or in India. The Fifth Republic does provide for some direct democracy through referendums, 
and in fact was inaugurated by referendum, as per the third article of its Constitution which 
states that this is the means for the people to exercise their national sovereignty, as well as 
through the election of their representatives.186 Indeed, we have seen in the first section that 
governments will often employ referendums as temporary and consultative instances of direct 
democracy, although this can scarcely be qualified as participatory democracy, aside from 
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viewing referendums as an opportunity for the people to directly participate in the voting of a 
legislative proposal in the stead of their elected representatives. However, while the article 
preceding the third on referendums codifies a reiteration of American President Lincoln’s 
exalted Gettysburg Address, that the French Republic shall be a ‘government of the people, by 
the people and for the people’; referendums have historically been used in France primarily in 
order to render some sense of legitimacy to an incredibly strong and sovereign executive, who 
reserves the final discretion to issue such referendums, not the people.187 This direct democracy 
is trivial in that sense, and while France’s representative system may be sufficiently appropriate 
to be considered a modern liberal democracy, these constitutional provisions for popular 
participation are nowhere near the standard by which Landemore defines true open and 
participatory democracy, for which the people’s deliberations in the public sphere should be, 
at least to some extent, binding.188  
 
i. The bureaucratisation of participatory democracy in France 
 
Nevertheless, participatory democracy has been present in some form or other at a local level 
in France, especially since the turn of the 21st century. Boyron writes of the 2004 Charter for 
the Environment as representative of a recent resurgence of interest in the ‘rights and political 
participation of the sovereign French citizens’, born perhaps from a March 2003 constitutional 
reform aimed at improving local democracy, which ‘introduced decentralisation into the 1958 
Constitution, granting all territorial government the power to organise local referendums’.189  
Occasionally, at a national level, participants have been randomly selected in a one-off 
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consultation to some Government legislative project, such as for the ‘Citizens’ Jury on 
Vaccination’ in 2016, which was organised to ‘propose opinions and recommendations for the 
new action plan on vaccination regulation’.190 In what seems strangely prescient for our current 
coronavirus pandemic, the French Health Ministry then sought to legitimate its proposals to 
make eight vaccinations mandatory for the French people (rather than merely recommended), 
by summoning a panel of experts as well as this Citizens’ Jury to deliberate their legislative 
proposal; however there is little evidence as to the impact the participants had on the final bill, 
although it is certain the citizens had no normative power aside from having the opportunity to 
voice their opinion.191 More often, this form of participation has been seen in local 
municipalities in the past decade or two, where ‘the stakes are less political, and it’s easier to 
innovate’, for example in the south-eastern commune of Saillans where inhabitants are 
regularly randomly selected to elaborate local urban planning; or in the Alsatian town of 
Kingerhseim, where until 2019 the mayor Jo Spiegel organised participatory councils with 40% 
of its members being randomly selected to ‘co-construct communal projects with experts and 
local elected ministers’.192 Landemore analyses these instances of participation as due to an 
urge by the people to resist technocratic elitism and so to diversify their predominantly white, 
male, university-educated local government officials; an urge which leads to ‘municipalism’ 
and manifests for example in an increase in ‘citizens’’ or ‘participatory’ parties on local 
election rolls, whose candidates are randomly selected.193 
 
190 ‘OECD Database of Representative Deliberative Processes and Institutions (2020)’ (Airtable) 
<https://airtable.com> accessed 5 August 2021.  
191 ‘Vaccination : retour sur la concertation citoyenne’ <https://www.santepubliquefrance.fr/liste-des-
actualites/vaccination-retour-sur-la-concertation-citoyenne> accessed 20 August 2021. 
192 Claire Legros, ‘Tirage au sort, la démocratie du citoyen ordinaire’ Le Monde.fr (12 June 2020) 
<https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/06/12/tirage-au-sort-la-democratie-du-citoyen-
ordinaire_6042571_3232.html> accessed 5 August 2021. 
193 Ibid.  
 62 
 
Participatory democracy, even where introduced with the best of intentions, will inevitably be 
affected by the environment in which it is imported, and so this local participatory turn has 
tended to result in a uniquely French phenomenon that a recent paper has named the 
‘bureaucratisation of democratic communalism’, symptomatic of the importance the Fifth 
Republic places on public administration.194 Gourgues, Mazeaud and Nonjon write that ‘citizen 
participation (has recently become) a normal practice of local democracy’ around the world, 
but that while there is much research on the abstract concept of participatory democracy, not 
enough emphasis is put on the ‘empirical study of what administrations, and their civil servants, 
actually do when they implement what they term “citizen participation”, “participatory 
democracy” or any other expression associated with a new participatory imperative’.195 They 
explain that ‘citizen participation is inseparable form a process of professionalisation, which 
has resulted, particularly in France, in the creation of administrative services dedicated to the 
management of these arrangements’, a phenomenon with its origins in the ‘recruitment by 
French local authorities of the first participation professionals towards the end of the 1980s, 
(…) mainly drawn from the ranks of campaigners with urban action groups’, further 
consolidated by the constitutional initiatives for increased local democracy of 2003.196 The 
authors’ conclusion is therein that French participatory democracy, to the extent that it exists 
through local randomly selected consultations, has been bureaucratised to the detriment of the 
ideal implementation of the paradigm. This awakening to the realities of public administration 
is important for any advocates of participatory democracy to bear in mind, so as to tame any 
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grandiose utopian visions of the idea being immune to the flaws of our current governance. 
Further, while it is interesting to note that there has been some level of participation in French 
local government in the past twenty years, it is self-evident that listening to a portion of 
randomly selected people via consultative bodies is not as demanding of municipalities as 
granting them the normative power to effect their proposals. To this effect, participatory 
democracy has struggled to flourish at a local level for the same reasons as on a national scale: 
because of the ‘presidential and almost monarchic features of (executive) municipal power’.197  
 
ii. The Paris Commune of 1871 
 
While today’s France has bureaucratised the little participatory democracy present in its local 
governance, therein contributing to disappointment, disillusion and especially scepticism of the 
idea, this has not always been the case in the polity. The political philosophy of the 18th century 
Enlightenment culminated in the French Revolution, and we have seen that its thinkers such as 
Rousseau who had a direct influence on the Constitutions of the First Republic, tended to prefer 
a platonic ideal of some direct participatory democracy, which they commiserated as 
unattainable, to the more practical representative alternative. Alexis De Tocqueville was one 
such thinker, who wrote famous treatises on the development of the governance in America 
not long after its own constitutional Revolution, and eventually had a hand in drafting the 
Constitution for the 2nd French Republic of 1848.198 Incidentally, De Tocqueville had travelled 
to Algeria, from which he wrote his ‘Travail sur l’Algérie’, criticising France’s colonial habits 
an entire century before the ‘crisis’ which birthed the Fifth Republic.199 In his writings, De 
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Tocqueville was ‘concerned about the tendency for a communally oriented society like France 
to become a non-mediated individualistic society’, and so suggested that ‘democracy could 
take two forms: an atomistic despotism where citizens tend to their own self-interests such that 
rulers are free to centralize their power, or a participatory democracy where public-spirited 
institutions can serve as a check on the centrifugal forces of democracy’.200 It is clear then that 
Enlightenment views on governance were favourable towards participatory democracy amidst 
a period of Revolutions, and De Tocqueville pre-empted Habermas’ public sphere in 
advocating for ‘civic associations as a central mechanism for transforming the atomistic form 
of democracy into the participatory one’.201  
 
The influence of De Tocqueville’s and his fellow political philosophers’ meliorative writings 
on participatory democracy can be traced to a radical iteration of the idea in French history 
completely opposite to its bureaucratic local expression today: participatory democracy found 
a home in the ‘Paris Commune’ of 1871. The 2nd French Republic had fallen to Napoleon III’s 
Second French Empire, but two turbulent decades later this too was collapsing after defeat in 
the Franco-Prussian war. Amidst the transition to France’s 3rd Republic in 1870, which would 
stay in place until the 1940 Nazi Occupation and subsequent Vichy Government, an 
insurrectionary group known as the ‘Communards de Paris’ revolted against the new republic, 
seeking more radical reform.202 In 1871, they were able to occupy the capitol city of Paris for 
two complete months, forming what became known as the Paris Commune, where feminist, 
socialist and anarchist currents influenced debate between various factions, such as the 
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Jacobins who sought a second Revolution, the ‘Proudhonists’ who desired a national French 
federation of socialist communes, and the more militant socialists known as the ‘Blanquists’.203 
The Paris Commune came to a passionate yet violent end in what was known as the ‘bloody 
week’, where the French National Guard stormed the city and killed twenty thousand 
insurrectionists, arresting and deporting countless others, before the 3rd Republic was officially 
re-instated. Nonetheless, the legacy of the Paris Commune would live on in its profound 
influence on two former residents of Paris who reverently watched the radical movement from 
afar: Karl Marx and Frederich Engels.  
 
Marx had been living in Paris only a few decades before the 1871 Paris Commune, as a writer 
for the radical-left German newspaper ‘Forward!’, and in 1844, he had a fateful meeting with 
Engels at the Café de la Régence, establishing a lifelong friendship and partnership.204 Marx 
was expelled from France a year later in 1845 by the French Government pursuant to a request 
from the Prussian King to shut down his newspaper, but Paris had nonetheless made a profound 
impression on the young radical, and Marx would go on to write one of his most well-known 
pamphlets ‘The Civil War in France’ in defence of the Paris Commune, which he described as 
‘the first example of the dictatorship of the proletariat’, after his outrage at its suppression.205 
Johnstone writes that ‘the (Paris) Commune provided Marx with the only opportunity in his 
lifetime to discuss in any detail the characteristics of the transition period that he believed lay 
between capitalism and a classless Communist society’, and it ‘represented for him the first 
experience of the working class holding political power, albeit extremely briefly and under 
exceptional circumstances in one city’; therefore ‘the Paris Commune occupies a central 
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position in Karl Marx's political thought’.206 Marx himself described the Paris Commune as 
the ‘initiation of the social revolution of the nineteenth century (…) which would make le tour 
du monde’.207  
 
The Paris Commune was notable for its combined advocacy for a social federation and for 
participatory democracy, as Johnstone elaborates: ‘it entailed a thorough going participatory 
democracy, combining direct democracy at the base with the election at regional and national 
levels of delegates operating under continuous control and briefing from below’, which Marx 
saw as a fitting form of governance ‘to prepare the way for a classless and stateless society’.208 
Marx’s pamphlet on the Paris Commune was ‘deeply democratic, anti-elitist and anti-
bureaucratic (…) reflecting his horror of giant state bureaucracies alienating man politically’, 
and so in it he was inspired by the Communards to advance the  ‘“self-government of the 
producers” with “the haughteous masters of the people” replaced by “their always removable 
servants . . . continuously under public supervision”’.209 Marx’s ‘communism’ was therein 
inspired in part by the Paris Commune, and notably by its principles of participatory self-
governance which would ultimately obviate the need for a State and replace it with some loose 
federation of local participatory communes. Of course, this can be contrasted with study of the 
bureaucratisation of local participatory democracy in France, which perhaps Marx would have 
criticised as flawed for being too reliant on the existing capitalist State structure and its 
centralised public administration. Another point to note is that where elections were proposed 
by the Paris Commune, they were to be ‘under continuous control’ by the Communards 
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themselves as emphasised by Johnstone, and only would have acted as a support to the 
preferred paradigm of direct participatory democracy, reminiscent somewhat of the ancient 
Athenian’s occasional use for elections to supplement their participatory governance.210 I 
would further submit that this model of citizen control could be viewed as some form of 
inverted ‘panopticism’, in which the people themselves collectively and coercively hold their 
participatory self-governance to account, rather than being observed by some traditional 
Orwellian State Panopticon situated above the people.211 
 
We can see therefore that despite its more modern bureaucratisation of participatory 
democracy, France has a history of radical movements for participation, which Marx even saw 
as the means towards his communist end of surpassing the State. In fact, participatory 
democracy has a rich history not only with communism, but also with theories of anarchism. 
Kinna, who also takes the example of the Paris Commune, elaborates on a theory known as 
‘democratic communalism’, which reconciles Marxist and anarchist political thought in that 
advocates for socialist decentralised federalism and autonomous self-government, very much 
in the vein of the Proudhonist Parisian Communards.212 Kinna explains that Murray Bookchin 
specifically advocated for a confederal constitution model of this democratic communalism 
which would shift from an ‘anaemic parliamentarism’ to a ‘libertarian municipalism’, inspired 
by Athenian participatory democracy, but with a greater emphasis on egalitarianism.213 
Bookchin was anti-parliamentary and anti-representational; believing that an ‘anarchist 
democracy calls for citizens to exercise power directly in their communities while prescribing 
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the policy that assemblies can legitimately enact (…) and creates a vital democratic public 
sphere, empowering citizens to regulate municipal institutions’.214 In a clear inspiration from 
Habermas, while still remaining closer to Landemore’s appeal for more normative 
participation, Kinna shows that Bookchin viewed anarcho-communism as requiring ‘directly 
democratic, open, participatory citizens’ assemblies and, above all, the idea of public space’, 
as well as ‘consensus decision-making’ which ‘breaks with standard electoral models’.215 Olin 
Wright corroborates this Marxist analysis in a more modern assessment of participatory 
democracy and sortition, in which he writes:  
 
‘a sortition legislature should prove more capable than an elected one at reforming capitalism, 
as well as potentially pursuing a trajectory that moves beyond capitalism. If this prediction is 
correct, however, this reduces the likelihood that a capitalist state would permit the creation of 
a sortition assembly’.216 
 
France, like all polities, has experienced participatory democracy to some extent, especially in 
local experiments in random selection for public consultations. However, despite the watering 
down of the grand expectations of these participatory reforms by France’s inevitable 
bureaucracy, there is a unique germ of a more radical participatory democracy in the polity’s 
past which originated from the Paris Commune of 1871 and went on to inspire anarcho-
communist democratic communalism as a potential means for superseding the need for 
bureaucratic government. However, France had not yet experienced participatory democracy 
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to a higher degree until our case study of the CCC, which may have the potential to resurrect 













































Chapter II – The organisational and legal aspects of the CCC  
 
This second chapter will seek to lay out our case study in three respective sections: the events 
of the ‘Yellow Vests’ protests and the ‘Grand National Debate’ which led to the creation of the 
CCC; the hierarchy of the CCC’s constitutional governance under the Fifth French Republic; 
and finally how the CCC organised the selection and deliberations of its participants.  
 
A) The circumstances leading to the CCC 
 
As I have now established the broader context leading into our case study, I will zoom in on 
the more recent events which preceded the CCC. 2019 was called the ‘year of global protest’, 
where around the world we all bore witness to frequent civil disobedience and demonstrations 
on a plethora of varied issues such as surrounding Brexit or the #MeToo movement.217 That 
year also saw the gilets jaunes, or ‘Yellow Vests’ protests in France which preceded the CCC, 
and similar movements such as the ‘Movimento cinque stelle in Italy, (which) express a politics 
that is hard to pin down’.218 However, many of these diverse protests can be broadly seen as 
collectively stemming from increasing socio-economic inequalities within and between given 
polities, and protestors’ subsequent perceived loss in legitimacy and trust in their governments 
to help alleviate those inequalities,219 much of which is only furthered by continuing neo-
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colonial ‘economic exploitation and cultural subordination’ through the law.220 In an 
interesting causal development, we saw in the OECD report in the first section that these causes 
for protest have a tendency to revive the protestors’ interests in participatory democracy as a 
more inclusive and trustworthy alternative to what they often see as their current corrupt and 
neoliberal electoral governance.221 Such was the case in the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement 
of 2011 which began in New York City’s Zuccotti Park, in its financial district, against socio-
economic inequality and a perceived deficiency of ‘real democracy’ in the US, which has been 
described as ‘having an overriding commitment to participatory democracy’ as it exhibited a 
notable use of general assemblies and democratic working groups, where ‘any protestor was 
able to have their say’, much in the spirit of Athenian isegoria and isonomia.222 
 
i. The ‘Yellow Vests’ protests 
 
In France, the Yellow Vests protests began in November 2018 and peaked in early 2019, though 
the movement continues even to this day as the ‘longest protest movement in France since 
1945’,223 as can be seen for example in a demonstration ‘against President Macron’s 
introduction of a COVID-19 health pass requirement for daily activities’ on the very day of my 
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writing this (August 21st, 2021).224 The Yellow Vests movement began only a year after the 
last presidential election in France, which saw Macron win against Marine Le Pen, who 
nevertheless commanded 34% of the vote for her ‘Front National’ far-right wing party.225 Le 
Pen was France’s answer to former American President Trump, and the more extreme English 
Brexiteers: she represented and even today still advocates for conservative nationalism and 
stokes prejudiced xenophobia.226 Thus, the political climate at the time was alike many other 
polities in the world then, and largely still today: rife with increasing division and uncertainty. 
A specific trigger can nonetheless be identified for the Yellow Vests protests, and that is unrest 
caused by government actions aimed at fighting climate change.  
 
In 2015, the United Nations Climate Change Conference, known as the COP21, was hosted by 
France and resulted in the international Paris Agreement on the reduction of climate change, 
which committed all signatories to ‘containing the temperature rise to well below 2 degrees 
Celsius’, and so to ‘formulate development strategies with low greenhouse gas emissions’ in 
order to achieve carbon neutrality, although of course the treaty contains no provisions for its 
enforcement.227 The agreement was weakened when the US withdrew from the agreement 
under Trump’s cabinet, and tangentially many of its signatories found it difficult to locally 
implement and enforce its measures to reduce carbon emissions. So was the case in France, 
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where Macron’s ‘carbon fuel tax rises and reduction of speed limits from 90 to 80 km/h in rural 
areas’ juxtaposed in contrast with his plan for ‘tax cuts benefiting the rich’ was ‘deemed unfair 
to the poor’, and so increased the momentum in the growing Yellow Vests movement which 
‘made the headlines of French political life for nearly six months, with aftershocks still being 
felt’.228  
 
The movement had begun with an ‘online petition to lower fuel taxes signed by over 300,000 
people by mid-October’, and ‘a Facebook event calling for a national blockade of roads, and 
the proposed use of Yellow Vests for the protests’, as ‘all French motorists are required by law 
to carry yellow roadside safety vests in their vehicles’, from which point the practical origin of 
the Yellow Vests was abstracted into an enduring homogenous symbol of French civil 
unrest.229 November 17th  marked the first major Yellow Vests protest with hundreds of 
thousands of people in attendance, and subsequent protests have gathered every Saturday since 
to demonstrate across the country, although especially in Paris.230 The protests became 
increasingly large, and ‘included serious material destructions by the Yellow Vests as well as 
considerable violence of the police against the protestors’.231 While many Yellow Vests were 
peaceful protestors, the magnitude and ambivalence of the movement fostered an environment 
in which rioters known as ‘casseurs - thugs from the ultraleft and ultraright’ could incite 
violence and vandalism, notably ‘defacing the Arc de Triomphe, looting shops, vandalising 
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buildings and attacking police’.232 In response, the French police soon adopted a ‘zero tolerance 
policy’, and ‘the riot ‘CRS’ police (began to use) tear gas and water cannons, and some of them 
were authorised to carry semi-automatic weapons’, to the extent that fighting between the 
protests and the riot police led to much violence and several deaths, for example in traffic 
accidents caused by Yellow Vests roadblocks, or as in the tragic case of an ‘80-year-old woman 
in Marseille (who) died from injuries she received when a tear gas grenade hit her in the face 
as she closed her apartment windows to protests below’.233 
 
The Yellow Vests movement notably had no leader or specific demands; rather it was a melting 
pot of civil frustration towards the French Government, all across the political spectrum and 
for myriad reasons, impossible to pin down. As we saw, the protests have been identified as 
originating due to the anger of the working class at growing inequality, and was specifically 
inflamed by an increase in fuel tax in following Macron’s environmental policy.234 However, 
‘by the 1st of December (2018), an anti-Macron protest was organized, marking the beginning 
of the change from anti-fuel tax to more anti-governmental protests’,235 and so issues such as 
an increase in minimum wage, as well as more radical calls to dissolve the National Assembly, 
for Macron to resign, or even for a 6th Republic with new institutions became a focus of the 
Yellow Vests protests.236  
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A Harris Interactive poll conducted in late 2018 showed that 72% of French people supported 
the Yellow Vests, despite riots, although 85% were against the violence.237 It is clear then that 
due to a perceived substantial lack of legitimacy and agency in their self-governance, the 
French people felt they had no alternative means to participate in their democracy aside from 
through protest, which may have started with the fuel-tax, but revealed to be more 
fundamentally rooted in disenchantment with their political institutions and even the 
Constitution of the Fifth Republic. Orford analyses this sentiment of anger at illegitimate 
governance, essential to the Yellow Vests protests, as stemming in part from some malady of 
the Habermasian public sphere, in which citizen deliberation is not only inaccessible through 
ordinary State institutions, but further discouraged by a new era of ‘post-truth’, in which 
misinformation propagated across social media to online factions actively increases political 
division and conflict, and had a role to play in the development of the Yellow Vests 
movement.238 However, while some may broadly and pejoratively define this movement as 
‘populist’, Balibar suggests that the Yellow Vests protests could be construed as a form of 
‘counter-populism’, due to the certain groups within the movement’s striking eagerness for 
participatory democracy as a means of resolving their democratic frustration.239 In this sense, 
the Yellow Vests movement is reminiscent of the Paris Commune of 1871, in that both 
surpassed insurrectionist violent protest from a variety of factions by putting forward 
democratic participatory practices, in order to better express their disillusionment and 
collectively seek reform.  
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ii. The ‘Grand National Debate’ 
 
On January 14th of 2019, President Macron responded to the Yellow Vests protests by initiating 
Le Grand Débat National, or ‘the Grand National Debate’, in an open letter to the French 
people: a series of participatory regional conferences, ‘to develop (a hierarchy of) propositions 
on the four key topics of the Debate: Ecological Transition, Tax System, Organization of State 
and Administration and Democracy and Citizenship’.240 Throughout March 2019, over the 
duration of one and a half day conferences, 70-100 citizens would be randomly selected in each 
region of the country and the overseas territories, and invited to participate in small groups 
where they could ‘exchange, deliberate and elaborate propositions’ on the four themes.241 At 
first, there was scepticism regarding the Government’s sincerity, and by the end of the month 
after the Grand Debate’s announcement, some Yellow Vests had countered with their own 
alternative Vrai Débat, or ‘Real Debate’, especially due to anger at a law passed by the French 
Parliament in early 2019 which substantially infringed on the freedom to demonstrate, as well 
as increased police violence against protestors.242 However, another strand of the Yellow Vests 
protestors known as the Gilets Citoyens, or ‘Citizens Vests’, in co-operation with the 
Démocratie Ouverte (‘Open Democracy’) collective, the actress Marion Cottillard and drafter 
of the COP21 Paris Accords Laurence Tubiana, advocated strongly for randomly selected 
citizens’ assemblies and to ameliorate the participatory methodologies of the Grand Debate 
and make them ‘more efficient, open and deliberative, and so more democratic’.243 
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The Gilets Citoyens subdivision of the Yellow Vests protestors were hopeful that the Grand 
Debate would appease protestors by making a substantial impact on their grievances and so 
increasing the legitimacy of the Government, and ostensibly President Macron seemed to share 
this wish. However, Landemore writes that before the Grand Debate began, ‘Macron first 
toured France, meeting the mayors of each of France’s 18 regions in a wave of events that 
looked more like a political campaign than deliberation’;244 the President exhibited great 
showmanship, such as by ‘throwing himself into spectacular hours-long, live-streamed 
sessions with French mayors (…) [where] he impressed and reassured many that France has an 
able captain at its helm’.245 In the earlier section ‘B)ii.’ of the First Chapter, we have seen the 
strength of the executive in the Fifth Republic, which is reflected in Macron’s ‘top-down 
leadership approach’, and felt by the French people to the extent that the President was accused 
of ‘using the Grand Debate as a campaign platform for the May 2019 EU elections’.246  
 
The public perception of the experiment was further worsened when the Government itself 
decided to organise the debate instead of the Commission of National Public Debate 
(abbreviated as the CNDP in French), so that the ‘government’s stewardship of the whole 
process seemed to run counter to the idea of handing power back to the people (…) casting 
suspicion on the process’s independence’.247 The CNDP was established in its current iteration 
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by the 2003 local democracy constitutional reform discussed in the previous section, as an 
independent administrative authority acting on behalf of the State, though not under the 
mandate of the executive. In following with the right in the 2004 Charter for the Environment 
to public participation and consultation on environmental matters, the CNDP has competence 
over large environmental projects ‘sponsored by the government, by local authorities, by state-
owned companies or by the private sector’, and has the power to ‘organise a public debate’ and 
to provide a guarantor ‘responsible for ensuring that the principles of participation are 
respected’.248 However, the CNDP cannot legally regulate or sanction the outcomes of its 
recommendations, and so merely acts as a consultative body.249 Nevertheless, Macron would 
have increased the legitimacy of the Grand Debate if it has been organised and guaranteed 
independently by the CNDP.  
 
In any case, Landemore explains that ‘deliberative kits’ were issued by the Government to 
encourage the French people to organise their own meetings, with instructions on how to share 
their outcomes to a public website, and procedural recommendations, which resulted in ten 
thousand such meetings taking place all over the country.250 Further, inspired by the cahiers de 
doléances of the 1789 French Revolution, French citizens were invited to write their 
suggestions or proposals in ‘grievance books’ either online or in their local city halls. Sixteen 
thousand such grievance books supplemented by two million online contributions were 
submitted, and so Landemore estimates that if ‘roughly 500,000 of France’s 67 million citizens 
actively contributed to the Great Debate, 0.74% of the population’, then this would be ‘a 
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proportion that is in the range of other known crowdsourcing experiments’, such as for the 
Iceland 2011 crowdsourced constitutional experiment referred to in an earlier section.251 
Landemore sees the Grand Debate as flawed in its naive attempt to foster a ‘genuinely equal 
opportunity to participate’ in the deliberation on public policy, as ‘it is not possible to gather 
millions of citizens in a common space and give them equal opportunities to participate in 
deliberation’.252 Instead, Landemore would argue for future such experiments to opt for the 
mini public which operates by lot, with its principle of random stratified sortition ensuring 
equal opportunity to participate, but with the focused citizens’ assembly acting as a more 
efficient and productive means towards an end of meaningful deliberation.  
 
The Grand Debate, while ‘celebrated as a huge success by the government’, was nevertheless 
‘denounced by the Yellow Vests as a smoke screen and a deception’, and this critique was 
substantiated by the large lacuna of ‘minority inclusion and representation, as well as 
possibilities for real deliberation’.253 Ehs and Mokre therein conclude of the Grand Debate that 
it was not sufficiently inclusive, not least because the ‘the geographical distribution of local 
meetings showed a strong correlation between the number of meetings and the votes for 
Macron in a region, thereby, obviously, excluding inhabitants of other regions’, but also due to 
the participation in the Grand Debate being ‘a composition quite different from the socio-
economic composition of the population and diametrically opposed to the one of the Yellow 
Vests’.254 Under-representation of women, minorities, younger generations and unemployed 
people with less income were methodological flaws of the Grand Debate and undermined its 
participatory promise. A further methodological critique surrounds the superficial and 
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unstructured nature of the deliberation itself, and the ethos of the Grand Debate as generally 
favouring quantity over quality, as the regional meetings and conferences took an ‘open mic 
forum’ style, with ‘conclusions rarely reached or documented’.255 Landemore derided the lack 
of rigour in the Grand Debates attention to the organisation and fostering of its participants’ 
dialoguing as ‘deliberation in the wild’.256 In her analysis, the National Debate was ‘an effort 
to structure the informal public sphere in a way that might indeed render it more effective at 
setting the agenda for the public sphere’, however the formal sphere of the executive still 
retained ultimate discretion as to what to do with the citizens’ propositions, and in any case 
Landemore’s more ‘radical break’ of open democracy would demand the higher standard of 
removing the ‘clear-cut separation (…) between ordinary citizens on the one hand and 
professional politicians on the other’.257 
 
In the end, Macron did little with the proposals which arose out of the French Grand National 
Debate, aside from defending France’s existing representative democracy and offering a reform 
which would see that ‘the share of proportional voting could go up to 20 percent’, while 
‘bluntly rejecting the idea of introducing a citizen-led referendum, a core ask of the Yellow 
Vests in late 2018’.258 However, the most significant outcome of the Grand Debate was that it 
offered France to experiment with participatory democracy on a scale never before seen in the 
polity, despite its negligent methodological oversights, which tempted Macron to ‘take a step 
further’ in ‘closing the Grand National Debate’, by ‘making a public commitment to a create a 
dedicated citizens’ assembly on climate – the CCC’.259 
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259 Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet, et al.  “Deliberating on Climate Action: Insights from the French Citizens’ 
Convention for Climate”, supra, note 1.  
 81 
 
B) The governance of the CCC 
 
President Macron’s initiative for a Citizens’ Convention on Climate was proposed by the 
‘Citizens Vests’ collective offshoot of the Yellow Vests, and the CESE, during the Great 
National Debate, and inspired by ‘an emerging trend in participatory and deliberative 
democracy’, in which ‘citizens’ assemblies are increasingly organized across the world to 
address difficulties inherent in climate action’, such as the ‘Climate Assembly UK’, and 
previous climate citizens’ assemblies in Australia and Ireland.260 We have now seen how the 
history of the idea of participatory democracy in France’s constitutional arrangements 
culminated in the Grand National Debate being prescribed as democratic medicine to the 
Yellow Vests protests, symptomatic of a wider perceived legitimacy deficit in French 
governance. We have also seen how despite the radical Paris Commune of 1871, participatory 
democracy in France has tended to be local and bureaucratised since the 2003 constitutional 
reform, and while the Grand Debate was a national project, the CCC proposed by Macron was 
a further step towards Landemore’s vision of participatory democracy: a centralised mini-
public, employing random selection for its participants, with the potential for further 
institutionalisation. After the Grand Debate, Landemore noted that it had cost eleven million 
euros to fund ‘without bringing significant gains in data or generalisable and reproducible 
knowledge’ on participatory democracy in practice, and so pleaded that the same mistake not 
to be made by the CCC, which would cost a further five and a half million euros of public tax-
payer money to pay for the participants’ and organisers’ fees as well as general logistics.261 
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She hoped for the CCC to ‘allow for the precise advancement of our knowledge on the 
conditions which allow for deliberation between citizens to function’, and echoed Macron’s 
own words that the CCC could lay down the foundations for a ‘Republic of permanent 
deliberation’.262  
 
i. The constitutional authority and mandate of the CCC 
 
Our case study of the CCC was created under President Macron’s authority, granted to him by 
the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which states that the President ‘shall ensure, by his 
arbitration, the proper functioning of the public authorities and the continuity of the State’.263 
Of course, in theory, this authority derives from the French people themselves as sovereign, 
who through their referendum approved the Constitution, and through their direct universal 
suffrage elected their President, from whence derives Macron’s legitimacy. Therein, Macron 
formally initiated the CCC in July of 2019, only a few months after the Grand National Debate, 
by instructing his Prime Minister to invite participants to ‘define structuring measures to 
manage, in a spirit of social justice, to cut France’s greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% 
by 2030 compared to 1990’ in a letter addressed to the head of the CESE, ‘to whom the 
organisation of the CCC was delegated’.264 The CESE, as elaborated in the earlier section on 
France’s constitutional arrangements, is a lesser known consultative constitutional assembly 
which ‘can be consulted by the Government on any social, economic or environmental 
issue’.265  
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264 Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet, et al.  “Deliberating on Climate Action: Insights from the French Citizens’ 
Convention for Climate”, supra, note 1.  
265 France 1958 (Rev. 2008) Constitution, supra, note 88, Art 69, Section 2.  
 83 
 
Girard highlights that there was no legal framework facilitating or regulating the 
implementation of citizens’ assemblies in France before the CCC, as the Grand Debate fell 
under the scope of the executive’s discretionary power to issue decrees, by which Macron 
encouraged the local participatory conferences, rather than a formal constitutional citizens’ 
assembly for the polity.266 The CCC was not organised by the CNDP, which had already 
declined to organise the Grand Debate, despite the CNDP being nonetheless intended by the 
2003 local democracy constitutional reform to serve as an ‘independent authority responsible 
for guaranteeing the right to participation (…) in the preparation of public decisions affecting 
the environment’, a right guaranteed under Article 7 of the 2004 Charter of the Environment 
annexed to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. In Girard’s analysis, citizens’ assemblies 
‘limit by design citizens’ participation in order to create a representative sample’, and so was 
averse to the CNDP, thus explaining why it did not undertake supervision of the CCC.267 
However, Landemore’s view on open mini-publics is that they facilitate the right to equal 
participation through sortition, in a more practical compromise than the Grand Debate’s own 
weak attempt to marshal the entire country into a devolved series of regional citizens’ 
assemblies. Landemore’s view is therefore not that citizens’ assemblies limit participation in 
order to create a representative sample, but precisely the reverse: the CCC model randomly 
selects a stratified sample to increase the equal opportunity to participate for all.  
 
In this light, I must disagree with Girard, and instead submit that the CCC could well have been 
organised under the competence of the CNDP, but that there are three possible reasons that 
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perhaps it was not. The most optimistic reason that Macron chose to delegate the CCC’s 
organisation to the CESE over the CNDP might be that he wanted the budding participatory 
experiment to be seen as more legitimate than the Grand Debate, and so the CESE could grant 
the authority of a constitutional institution that the CNDP would not provide; in any case 
Macron had already stated his intention to reform the CESE into a more permanent 
participatory body. A more neutral and pragmatic issue with the CNDP as host for the CCC is 
that its mandate is merely to organise debates for environmental projects; however, to organise 
an innovative experiment in a participatory assembly intended to go beyond debate and draft 
legislative proposals, as we will see, was perhaps beyond the capacity and scope of the CNDP. 
Finally, a third and more cynical reason that Macron may have delegated the CCC’s planning 
to the CESE is because strictly it is not an independent constitutional body but falls under the 
authority and control of the executive, in which the President would have this potentially 
radical experiment at an arm’s length in case he felt that he needed to assert his sovereignty. In 
this vein, no matter Macron’s intentions for the CCC’s delegated organisation, I agree with 
Girard’s conclusion that the CCC’s ‘purpose and impact ultimately depended on the will of the 
President of the Republic’, and can therefore be ‘described as a form of “soft constitutional 
law”: its creation was neither regulated nor prohibited by the French Constitution, and it did 
not have any the power to make legally binding decisions’.268 We will discuss this further in 
the next section, but my argument will be that Macron organised the CCC under the CESE 
rather than use the standard legislative process in which he could have easily consulted the 
Council of State only, prior to initiating a legislative project on climate, because it allowed him 
to outwardly appear to be endorsing participatory democracy while substantially retaining his 
executive power.  
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The CCC’s mandate as an ‘unprecedented democratic experiment in France, which aims to 
give citizens a voice to accelerate the fight against climate change’ was to ‘be directly involved 
in the preparation of the law (…) to define a series of measures that would allow to achieve a 
reduction of at least 40% in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 (compared to 1990) in a spirit 
of social justice’, and so to ‘bring together 150 people, all drawn by lot; to represent the 
diversity of French society’ to help to collectively shape these normative proposals.269 The 
CCC was granted the broad scope to ‘deal with issues relating to energy efficiency, thermal 
modernization of housing, agriculture, mobility, ecological taxation and any other mechanism 
it deems useful’, and after the citizen participant would ‘learn about, debate and prepare draft 
laws on all issues relating to ways to combat climate change’, their legislative proposals would 
be ‘submitted directly either to a referendum, a vote in Parliament or implementation’.270 
Importantly for our purposes and the future of the CCC, President Macron was very vocal that 
he was committed, and in fact promised, to bring the CCC’s proposals, whatever they may be, 
‘to the appropriate level’, ‘unfiltered’.271 
 
The CCC was to be extended over the length of ‘seven weekends over six months, and was 
designed to give citizens an opportunity to propose informed policy recommendations for 
addressing climate change’.272 In discussion with the OECD, Landemore praised the decision 
to launch the CCC as ‘a particularly important deliberative exercise, comparable to other 
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notable examples of deliberative processes, such as the 2010–2013 Icelandic constitutional 
process’, as it would be the first citizens’ assembly of its kind in France, a ‘diverse, 
multicultural, and populous country, and as such demonstrates the adaptability and 
applicability of these initiatives to a larger set of contexts’.273 
 
However, the complexity of the policy issue of equitably reducing green gas emissions the 
CCC was tasked with has no easy solutions, myriad nuanced factors, and affects the entire 
planet; not to mention that the Government’s attempt to enforce the COP21 Paris Agreement 
had resulted in the Yellow Vests protests at the origin of the CCC to begin with. It has been 
noted that this important political mandate to ‘pre-legislate’ on such an intricate matter of 
public policy has rarely been trusted to a group of randomly selected citizens on a global scale, 
and certainly never before within France, so the question asked of the CCC and the answer 
expected of its participants demonstrates the uniqueness of the experiment from the outset.274 
It was therein uncertain at the outset how the CCC, under the guise of a new experiment in 
participatory democracy, would approach and accomplish such a gargantuan task, although the 
hope was that its proposals would be more legitimate and better received by the French people 
than a direct decree made by Macron himself.  In the particular, the CCC’s mandate was to 
propose legislative projects to fight climate change, but more broadly, its implicit mandate, I 
will submit, was to shift blame away from the President no matter its outcome, and to return 
some legitimacy to a sovereign executive confronted by the insurrection of his citizens.  
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Once the CCC had been created and given its constitutional mandate, some structure was 
needed to organise and run the Convention, and give effect to that mandate. As we have seen, 
the CESE had been charged with this decree by President Macron, and it further delegated the 
task by assembling a ‘governance committee’ for the CCC.275 This governance committee was 
a ‘complex governance structure set up in order to assure neutrality and impartiality to the 
process’, and was made up of ‘several technical and legal experts as well as experts in 
participatory and deliberative democracy’; the committee’s mission was to accompany the 
CCC, from its inception to its end.276 The governance committee’s fifteen members were 
comprised of ‘representatives from various organisation (think tanks, unions, businesses), 
government officials and scholars with expertise in climate science, public policy and 
democratic practices’,277 such as the President of the CESE’s Environment Department Anne-
Marie Ducroux as well as Mathilde Imer, who is Co-Chair of the ‘Open Democracy’ 
organisation and an initiator of the ‘Citizens Vests’ collective which we discussed earlier – a 
branch of the Yellow Vests movement favouring participatory democracy.278 The governance 
committee was further meant to ensure the independence and impartiality of the CCC, and to 
assist in this, two citizens from the CCC’s participants were randomly selected ‘between each 
session’, to join the committee and ‘set the agenda and the rules for deliberations’.279 One of 
the two Co-Presidents of the governance committee and therein of the CCC itself was Laurence 
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Tubiana, one of the drafters of the COP21 Paris Accords and President of the European Climate 
Foundation, who we saw earlier also helped to initiate the ‘Citizens Vests’ collective and the 
subsequent Grand National Debate which arose from the Yellow Vests protests.280 Despite 
being a member of the governance committee, Tubiana testified directly to the citizens as an 
expert on the COP21 Paris Agreement in the opening session of the CCC.281 
 
Thierry Pech, the General Director of the ‘Terra Nova’ organisation, served as the second Co-
President of the CCC and its governance committee, and wrote retrospectively that the 
‘governance of the CCC was its second singularity’ (the first in his eyes being the uniqueness 
of its mandate, explained in the last section), due to its large size compared to other citizens’ 
assemblies which were presided over by a single person such as in Ireland, whose chair 
happened to be the President of its Supreme Court.282 Pech reflects that the governance 
committee was distinctly French in its emphasis on rules and bureaucracy compared to other 
more spontaneously-run citizens’ assemblies around the world, but that this allowed for the 
methodology and procedure of the CCC to be carefully pre-meditated and continuously re-
evaluated.283 The governance committee was collegial and so required a consensus on any 
decision it took; the citizen participants of the CCC were able to refer to the governance 
committee anytime via a private internet platform.284  
 
The governance committee, much like the French Government, had four other committees at 
its disposal to help to run the CCC, although it remained at the top of the normative hierarchy 
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of the five total committees. The CCC’s second committee was the ‘college of guarantors’, 
comprised of three members named respectively by the Presidents of France’s constitutional 
assemblies of the CESE, the Senate and the National Assembly who were charged with 
‘guaranteeing the independence of the Convention and its good working conditions’, and 
similar to the CESE itself or the Council of State, would act as a consultative body to its 
superior, the governance committee.285 The third committee was a ‘consortium’ to ‘facilitate 
and lead debates (…) assigned by public procurement’,286 and these facilitators would simply 
put into effect the decisions of the governance committee by working directly with the citizen 
participants, and ‘ensure that the work sessions functioned well’.287  
 
The final two organising committees add a third point of originality to the CCC, beyond its 
uniquely political mandate and governance. In a term coined by the French Prime Minister 
Édouard Phillippe, who has since been replaced by Jean Castex as the pandemic took over 
France’s political focus, the CCC’s ‘perhaps most distinctive feature (…) as compared to other 
citizens’ assemblies, is its approach based on “co-construction” between citizens and 
experts’.288 The mandate of the CCC required experts to assist the randomly selected citizen 
participants, who could not be expected to walk into the Convention already ably to ‘pre-
legislate’ proposals on climate change, and so this innovative model of co-construction was 
procedurally ‘built into the design’ of the CCC’s governance and operation.289 Therein, the 
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fourth committee to organise the CCC was a ‘group of 19 experts’ known as the ‘support 
committee’, who ‘provided technical background on greenhouse has emission reduction 
technologies and policies’, and provided advice on the citizens’ proposals.290 Finally, the fifth 
committee were a ‘group of six legal experts’ to ‘help the citizens formulate their proposals in 
“juridically sound” terms, a prerequisite for them being submitted “unfiltered”’.291 The co-
construction model is interesting in that it provided not only scientific expertise, but also legal 
drafting advice to the citizen participants. According to the authors of the paper I cite 
extensively in this thesis, who themselves observed and participated in the CCC, ‘such a 
committee is unparalleled in other citizens’ assemblies’.292 
 
These five committees then comprised the internal governance of the CCC, with the 
governance committee at the helm. As we saw, this internal mini-government was not entirely 
separate from the deliberations of the CCC’s citizen participants, as one of the Co-Presidents 
provided expert testimony, and further, the researchers reflecting on the Convention noted that 
‘organisers were not required to observe strict neutrality (…) we witnessed a co-chair, a 
guarantor, and members of the governance committee give their own opinions the citizens on 
some measures’.293 The internal governance of the CCC, led by the governance committee, can 
almost be seen as a devolved constitutional entity, with its own internal devolution of powers 
doled out to varying committees with different roles, and of course the citizens themselves. 
Perhaps necessary to the efficient structuring of the deliberation, the CCC’s participants were 
not as autonomous as one might have imagined for an experiment in participatory democracy. 
Instead, they were selected and made to deliberate based on a methodology decided by the 
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governance committee before they arrived, and then were simply led through the pre-planned 
sessions, as we will see, in order to fulfil their mandate. However, I would highlight that it is 
quite ironic that the fifteen members of the governance committee, effectively comprising a 
discretionary and unilateral executive council which equally held ‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ 
functions in the ‘legal system’ of the CCC, are in a way reminiscent of the French Directory 
(equally an executive committee) which preceded Napoleon’s coup; and that this long-threaded 
trace of France’s favourable disposition for strong executives embodied even today by Macron 
found its way into the heart of a participatory Citizens’ Convention, intended to (temporarily) 
return normative power to the people.  
 
However, we cannot forget that the devolution of power does not begin at the governance 
committee of the CCC. Throughout the CCC’s sessions, ‘plenary meetings were organised with 
the highest executives of the French State’, including the Minister of Ecological and Inclusive 
Transition, the Prime Minister, and President Macron himself.294 It is fair to say that the 
executive branch of the Fifth Republic kept a close watch on the goings on of the Convention 
they had organised, and that the power of the governance committee can be traced back to all 
the way through to Macron. As we saw in the last section, the President organised the CCC 
under his executive constitutional discretion, who then delegated its creation to his Prime 
Minister, the Minister of Ecological Transition and importantly, the CESE. The CESE has its 
own President elected by its 233 members,295 and devolved internal Cabinet comprised of 
delegates from various unions and federations to represent ‘employees, businesses, the interests 
of social and territorial cohesion, and environmental protection’.296 The President of the CESE 
 
294 ‘Home’ (Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat) supra, note 269. 
295 Loi organique n° 2010-704 du 28 juin 2010 relative au Conseil économique, social et environnemental. 
296 Décret n° 2021-309 du 24 mars 2021 fixant la répartition et les conditions de désignation des membres du 
Conseil économique, social et environnemental. 
 92 
created the governance committee for the CCC, which presides over the four other committees, 
all of the above culminating in an executive monopoly over the 150 participating citizens at 
the very bottom of the ladder of power, which as we will see in the final chapter indicates their 
place on Arnstein’s ‘ladder of citizen participation’: a taxonomy developed to indicate on a 
spectrum how normative a participatory body is.297 Under the ultimate authority of the 
President, the CCC displays a remarkable hierarchy of devolved executive power right through 
to its supposedly participatory Citizens’ Convention, so that the CCC’s own unwritten 
constitution was designed to keep it in check, and to a large extent, dependent on the many 
executive bodies of the State above it.  
 
C) The organisational aspects of the CCC 
 
After having explained the context leading up to the CCC, as well as its constitutional mandate 
and governance, this section will discuss how the CCC organised its participants’ selection and 
subsequent deliberation.  
 
i. Participant selection 
 
The selection of participants in the CCC was delegated by its governance committee to the 
Harris Interactive Institute, in order to draw lots for the mandated 150 citizens, who were to be 
randomly selected while also remaining ‘representative of the diversity of French society’.298 
The CCC’s Co-President Pech writes that the origin of the number of citizens arose from a 
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compromise between a perceived minimum of participants to be sufficiently representative, 
and a maximum for efficient deliberation.299 In following with the method chosen by the 
guarantors of the Grand National Debate, it was decided by the governance committee that the 
random selection should be based off of telephone numbers rather than the electoral lists used 
to select juries, as the latter excludes an estimated 9,5 million French citizens who are not 
registered on the electoral lists either intentionally or by mistake.300 From August to September 
2019, the Harris Institute therein ‘randomly generated a database of 300,000 telephone 
numbers, of which 85% were mobile phone numbers’, which the agency would call ‘during a 
6–9pm time slot’, ultimately contacting 96,500 phone numbers, of which 11.400 people 
responded.301  
 
In order to ensure the representativity of the randomly selected citizens, a stratified quota 
sampling was put in place which helped to narrow down and refuse potential participants, thus 
combining the randomised lots with the following socio-demographic criteria of ‘age, gender, 
education level, geographic origin, settlement (urban versus rural) and type of job’.302 For these 
categories, the governance committee tried to balance the proportion of citizens chosen for the 
CCC with the proportions of the given criteria in the general population, in order to re-create a 
‘miniature France’, and equally ‘took into account the distribution of the French population 
over the metropolitan regions and overseas territories’.303 Following these stratified criteria 
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then, 700 people of the 11,400 contacted were deemed ineligible to participate, while 6,600 
declined, with 4,100 remaining who expressed their interest in participating. Of that latter 
number, 191 citizens were selected by the same methods, with 41 who would act as substitutes 
to the mandated 150 for the Convention.304 It was found that that the ‘main obstacle to 
overcome’ in the acceptance rate of the invitation to participate ‘was the availability of people’, 
and that further, acceptance was ‘particularly low among people with lower degrees’.305 
Incentivisation, such as a daily allowance of ‘€86.04 per day (€1,462 total for the entire 
process)’; the  compensation of €10.03 per hour for lost professional income; and the 
subsidisation of travel, accommodation, meals and childcare (at €18 per hour) were all 
subsequently used to combat trepidation by those citizens invited, and encourage acceptance 
to participate.306 The governance and guarantor committees of the CCC supervised the control 
of the entire process of selection described, ‘to guarantee the impartiality of the draw’.307 
 
Co-President of the CCC, Pech, noted that a sample of 150 citizens is far too small to be 
statistically representative of France’s population of 67 million; however, the aim was instead 
to justify a ‘descriptive legitimacy’ of the sortition used to re-create the diverse socio-economic 
population of France with a mini-public.308 Another reason for the use of the mixed method of 
random selection and stratified quotas was to compensate for the unstable factor of the 
participation being voluntary, as the ‘representativity was vulnerable to the disproportionate 
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inclination of certain people to participate’ and the resulting ‘selection bias’.309 Within the final 
150 citizens selected, there was an over-representation of the Ile-de-France region and an 
under-representation of those citizens without the secondary-school degree of the 
Baccalaureate, which reflected ‘the difficulty in recruiting certain categories of people who 
may not feel concerned with the CCC or who live far from Paris’.310 However, the views of the 
150 citizens selected seemed to match those of the general population according to an external 
study comparing questionnaires filled out by respondents from both pools, though the CCC’s 
sample seemed to demonstrate a positive bias in concern for climate change, perhaps because 
the citizens volunteered to participate in the CCC, and were thus more likely to have an 
inclination towards fighting climate change and therefore an affinity with the mandate of the 
CCC.311   
 
In a webinar entitled ‘Revitalizing Democracy: Sortition, Citizen Power, and Spaces of 
Freedom’ hosted by the Hannah Arendt Centre at Bard College, Landemore stated her 
preference for a social-epistemological approach to citizen selection, in which the ‘diversity of 
background, experience, and expertise in a deliberative chamber by lot means it makes better 
decisions than a chamber of political elites’.312 While this methodology was indeed largely 
mirrored by the CCC’s governance committee, Landemore commented that there nonetheless 
‘ought to be farmers in the room in an assembly addressing an agricultural issue’, and so a true 
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stratified selection of participants should have adapted to the topic of the Convention by adding 
in a criteria of ‘pre-existing opinions on climate change’, as was done for the UK Climate 
Assembly.313 A further critique of the selection method for the CCC was that it notably 
excluded the characteristic of ethnicity which was also included in the UK Climat Assembly’s 
own methodology by contrast.314 
 
The CCC’s organisers chose to use stratified selection methods, yet the factors they decided to 
focus on in ensuring the representativeness of the French population could have been more 
intersectional, to a view of emphasising a voice, and a quota of participants in the Convention, 
for those who are ‘discriminated against due to overlapping and interdependent systems of 
disadvantage created by the interconnected nature of social categorisations such as race, class, 
and gender’.315 This approach was indeed taken in Ireland’s remarkable participatory 
Convention on the Constitution 2012-2014, for which ‘particular institutional design’ was used 
‘in an effort to achieve gender inclusion (…) reflected in terms of the recruitment of members 
and invited speakers as well as the procedures, processes and rules’.316 That Convention 
momentously resulted in Ireland being ‘the first country in the world to support the introduction 
of marriage equality by popular vote’, and also represented the ‘first time a recommendation 
(marriage equality) from a deliberative mini-public resulted in Constitutional change’.317 
Harris, Farrell, Suiter and Brennan, all researchers involved in the Irish Convention throughout 
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its running, note that ‘the ”gender gap” in deliberation should be of concern’ as ‘the exclusion 
of a significant section of society risks weakening the democratic legitimacy’ of the 
participatory process; the gender gap ‘undermines the diversity required to meet the epistemic 
and ethical functions of deliberative democracy’; and reduces the ‘levels of respect and overall 
satisfaction with the process’.318 Those researchers conclude then that ‘men’s and women’s 
attitudes differ on key policy issues and that they are impacted differentially by policy 
decisions’; therein, the focus on reducing the gender gap in citizens’ conventions ‘enhances 
women’s interest in politics and political participation’, and has the potential to help ‘redress 
the “confidence gap” in gendered perceptions of expertise and ability to engage in politics, 
possibly encouraging more women to run for political office’.319 
 
When compared to the UK Climate Assembly and the Irish Constitutional Conventions then, 
the CCC does not seem to have put as much priority into ensuring that under-represented 
minorities in the French population were included in their stratified selection of participants. 
This is especially troubling in considering the continuing colonial character of the French 
Constitution we discussed above, with overseas territories already being at a disadvantage in 
their constitutional displacement from the French ‘home territory’. This intersectional 
approach could have been extended further and included a critical disability rights focus for 
example, such as in following Mike Oliver’s ‘social model of disability’.320 This would have 
ensured that the quota sampling factors also safeguarded inclusion to the participatory 
assembly for the disabled; an often-overlooked minority treated as impaired, whereas Oliver 
would advocate the more equitable approach of instead critiquing society, not the individual, 
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as dysfunctional where it is inaccessible.321 While the CCC was still more representative than 
the Grand National Debate, it could have gone further to be more inclusive in its citizen 
selection.  
 
Earlier we saw that the Yellow Vests protests could be seen as a form of ‘counter-populism’ in 
the emerging faction of the ‘Citizens vests’ advocacy for participatory democracy, which 
resulted in the Grand Debate and eventually in the CCC.322 In a similar vein, Nancy Fraser 
combined Spivak’s ‘subaltern’ and Felski’s notion of ‘counter-publics’ to coin the ‘subaltern 
counter-public’: ‘discursive arenas that develop in parallel to the official public spheres (…) as 
a response to the exclusions of the dominant publics’; ‘where members of subordinated social 
groups invent and circulate counter discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their 
identities, interests, and needs’.323 These subaltern counter-publics ‘better promote the ideal of 
participatory parity’, and build off of an analysis of the Habermasian ‘bourgeois public spheres’ 
as ‘constituted by significant exclusions (…) referring mostly to women and to the non-
proprietary male working class’, which formed ‘competing counter-publics’, so that ‘the public 
sphere was always composed of conflictual and antagonistic publics’.324 Subaltern counter-
publics can be seen in our case study within the public sphere of the Yellow Vests protests, 
which created the counter-public of the ‘Citizens vests’, or in the ‘Real Debate’ which was 
agonistically organised in response to the Grand National Debate. Subaltern counter-publics 
‘challenge the supposed inclusiveness of the informal deliberations’ and are ‘bound to emerge 
as it is impossible to insulate discursive arenas from societal inequalities’; so subaltern counter-
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publics are ‘connected with the potential for hypothetically egalitarian societies to combine 
social equality, cultural diversity, and participatory democracy’.325 Applying this theory to the 
CCC, we see that the governance committee in charge of the selection of citizen participants 
should have included more positive efforts towards inclusive stratified selection,  and could 
have conceivably embraced a subaltern counter-public in what could have hypothetically even 
been a bi-cameral Citizens’ Convention: one chamber with its participants randomly selected 
purely by lot, and the other chamber composed of specifically stratified citizens according to 
more rigidly intersectional factors.  
 
In any case, it is clear that there is a link between the methodology for the selection of 
participants for a Citizens’ Assembly, and public perception and trust of the findings of that 
assembly. The researchers involved in the CCC noted that ‘in France, where mistrust in the 
governments is well established, it is particularly important to assess the public’s perceptions 
of the CCC’, and so they found that ‘the population’s judgment was rather pessimistic, as 49% 
(of those who have at least heard of the CCC) believe that the CCC was not representative (…) 
and among them, two thirds think that the CCC over-represents environmentalist or pro-
government people’.326 While compared to the French Parliament, ‘which is neither 
demographically nor politically’ representative, the CCC was much more diverse, yet subject 
to a ‘widespread ignorance and mistrust’ that caused a significant portion of the French people 
to perceive the CCC as ‘a masquerade set up by the government to close the Yellow Vests’ 
episode with a reconciliatory communication, pretending that the demands for more democracy 
and climate action had been met’, which, as we will see, was only worsened when Macron 
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‘Who Are the Citizens of the French Convention for Climate?’, supra, note 301. 
 100 
broke his promise to effect the CCC’s proposals ‘unfiltered’.327 The CCC’s participant 
selection can therefore serve as a lesson for future experiments in participatory democracy in 
France and beyond: that there is a greater need for inclusion, diversity, transparency and 
education about this selection process, if it is ever to build any trust in the people it is meant to 
represent.   
 
ii. Participant deliberation 
 
Once selected, the participants of the CCC were made to deliberate, so as to meet their 
constitutional mandate, and ‘define structuring measures to manage, in a spirit of social justice, 
to cut France’s greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% by 2030’. The political theory 
underpinning these deliberations is once again tied to the Habermasian public sphere. 
Habermas saw deliberation a ‘normative category which underlines a procedural conception of 
democratic legitimacy’, ‘based on normative exigencies of enlargement of individual 
participation on deliberation and decision processes and on development of a democratic 
political culture’.328 Therein, deliberation is essential to participatory democracy, as it creates 
the conditions for which citizens can make an informed normative decision, legitimated by 
dialogues within the diverse forum.  
 
Landemore calls this phenomenon ‘collective wisdom’, which she uses as an epistemic 
argument she entitles ‘democratic reason’.329 Democracy in any direct form has always been 
criticised as fundamentally flawed in its utilitarianism, and therefore dangerous without some 
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check on the power of an otherwise Tocquevillian tyrannous majority. However, Landemore 
subverts this pejorative connotation of majoritarianism with socio-legal epistemological 
research which argues that with sufficient diversity, a well-organised deliberative forum may 
yield more valuable and better-informed results due to the collective wisdom accrued by a 
larger group. The larger the group, the more cognitive diversity which ensues due to ‘many 
connected brains seamlessly and almost simultaneously exchanging information and 
arguments in ways that are costless and frictionless, resulting in enlightened individuals and 
enhanced collective intelligence’.330 As we have seen in the last section, ‘random selection and 
stratified sampling bring in typically excluded categories like youth, the disadvantaged, 
women, or others minorities into public policy and decision making’, and so participatory 
democracy is more likely to create a forum for diverse collective wisdom than its representative 
counterpart.331 James Fishkin notably echoed this idea of democratic reason in his advocacy 
for ‘deliberative polling’ as an alternative to say a simple referendum, in which polls are taken 
before and after a group have been made to deliberate in a participatory forum to see how their 
opinions may have evolved on controversial issues.332 
 
To explain how the deliberations of the CCC worked to stimulate the collective wisdom of its 
participants, I will rely on the accounts of the researchers who helped to organise and followed 
the CCC closely.333 After the organisation phase which began in July 2019 following the Grand 
Debate, the CCC itself was comprised of seven sessions, each lasting a long weekend of two-
and-a-half-days, spread over from December 2019 to the concluding session on June 19th, 
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2020, with the final sessions held either remotely or with social distancing due to the outbreak 
of the COVID-19 pandemic. The governance committee divided the sessions into plenary 
gatherings for the issues of financing and constitutional reform, whereas the citizens were 
randomly allotted to five thematic groups for smaller gatherings, relevant to France’s 
greenhouse gas emissions: ‘housing (Se loger), labor and production (Travailler et produire), 
transport (Se déplacer), food (Se nourrir), and consumption (Consommer)’.334  
 
The sessions’ organisation evolved as the CCC went on, but the first one introduced the 
participants to their mandate, timetable, and an overview of the science behind climate change 
from the experts on the Support Committee. Each session from then on would begin with the 
citizens launching their discussion with a revision of their proposals from the previous session, 
which had been re-drafted in the interim by the legal experts committee to the formal style of 
French statutory legislation. Afterwards, the facilitator committee would help the citizens to 
divide the remaining time in their sessions into either plenary or thematic group-work, in which 
the participants may have interrogated experts, deliberated in table gatherings, or began to 
expand on policy proposals. The sense is that the 150 citizens were provided with a loose 
atmosphere to somewhat improvise their work sessions according to how their debates and 
draft proposals were going, but that any of the five committees was ready to help should the 
citizens require anything to stimulate their deliberation. The researchers observed however that 
‘debates were sometimes confused, with citizens interrupting one another without intervention 
from the facilitators’, as the latter ‘seemed to avoid conflict as much as possible and instead 
sought to create and maintain consensus among citizens’, and so they would recommend 
further ‘training in deliberative methods’ for the participants in future such Conventions, as 
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well as space to be left for the constructive expression of dissent.335 In between sessions, the 
citizens were given broad discretion, even encouraged, to communicate in their hotel or online 
with each other, with the media, and with their local communities as well as various 
stakeholders.  
 
To culminate the sessions, the citizens presented their thematic group work in a plenary 
assembly in Session 6, during which they debated all together, suggested amendments, and 
finalised their proposals, with any proposal supported by at least twenty participants put to a 
vote. In the final seventh session, a final simple majority vote was carried out on each proposal 
and funding measure. The researchers highlighted here that one flaw in this procedure was that 
the citizens had only had the chance to help draft through their deliberations a fifth of the 
proposals from their own thematic working group, and had to vote on the remaining proposals 
without having had as much participation in their creation. Nevertheless, the participants 
approved of almost every proposal they had come up with in the CCC, and so ended up with a 
total of 149 ‘pre-legislated’ proposals on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In a surprise to 
the researches, the citizens ‘voted against submitting their policy proposals to referendum’, as 
‘the general public would not be as “enlightened” in their voting as the members of the 
Convention had become, and/or a referendum would more likely become a vote for or against 
the President of the Republic’.336 
 
Landemore notes of the CCC’s deliberations that a sense of solidarity over their mandate 
helped the citizens to evolve throughout the sessions, to either speak up if usually shy or quiet 
down if one had a tendency to be loudly critical, and to grow close despite their diverse 
 
335 Ibid.  
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backgrounds.337 Pech observed that ‘the experience showed that citizens are capable of tackling 
complex mandate issues’, but also cautioned that ‘procedural precautions should be put in place 
to prevent the influence of experts on citizens’.338 Indeed, the model of co-construction was 
very important to the CCC’s deliberations. The researchers discerned that ‘a glimpse at the 
460-page report and the profusion of technical and legal details it contains is telling of the 
degree to which experts effectively intervened’, and that ‘their overall contribution can be said 
to have been significant’.339 However, the co-constructive model left much room for 
improvement, as ‘invited experts seldom had the opportunity to challenge each other’s 
evidence (…) with very little debate among them’, and ‘the criteria that motivated who would 
be invited as an expert were never made explicit by the organizers’.340 Therein, further 
‘counter-expertise’ could be useful for future Conventions, where an increase in the plurality 
of available experts would increase their own cognitive wisdom, and go on to produce more 
impartial advice. Landemore nonetheless argues that ‘citizen participants were quite adept at 
pushing back against expert arrogance, aided by facilitators tasked with amplifying their 
private objections to the experts’ conduct’; for example ‘although many of the experts pressed 
and pressed for a carbon tax, the Convention rejected the idea’, perhaps because the 
controversial carbon tax had contributed to the Yellow Vests protests in the first place.341 
Landemore adds that ‘while a few of the Convention’s recommendations bear clear signs of 
 
337 Ieva Cesnulaityte, ‘A Closer Look at the French Citizens’ Convention on Climate’ (Medium, 27 March 2020) 
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accessed 5 August 2021, with Hélène Landemore. 
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certain experts’ influence – notably the recommendation that ‘ecocide’ be criminalised – the 
majority do not’.342 
 
This concludes the second chapter, which provided an overview the case study of the CCC, 
from the context that led to its creation, to its constitutional mandate, internal governance, and 
organisation in terms of the selection and deliberation of its participants. The next chapter will 





























































Chapter III – French Legislative Procedure, Interrupted? 
 
As the CCC and its broader context have now been introduced, I will be able to answer my 
research question: what was the actual and potential impact of the CCC on French governance?  
 
This chapter will first analyse the outcomes of the CCC, which saw the President break his 
promise to pass its proposals with ‘no filter’, yet Macron only recently promulgated a ‘Climate 
and Resilience’ Law nonetheless derived from the CCC. In the second section, I will argue that 
the CCC in any case is not a true instance of participatory democracy, and that its actual 
normative impact was limited by its consultive constitutional nature. Finally, the third section 
will pinpoint the CCC’s potential impact in the beginnings of the institutionalisation of 
participatory democracy in France, and then conclude by reflecting on what real participatory 
democracy in France would require. 
 
A) The outcomes of the CCC 
 
i. The President’s broken promise to legislate the proposals ‘unfiltered’  
 
In opposition to other citizens’ assemblies on climate, such as that of the UK, the CCC from 
its very inception was ‘cast a political chamber’, due to Macron’s promise of legislating the 
CCC’s proposals with ‘no filter’ via a referendum, parliamentary vote, or executive decree.343 
Thus, we saw in the last chapter that certain provisions were put in place to ensure that the 
CCC’s policies could be directly enacted into law, such as the creation of a committee of legal 
 
343 Claire Mellier & Rich Wilson, ‘Getting Climate Citizens’ Assemblies Right’ (Carnegie Europe) 
<https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/11/05/getting-climate-citizens-assemblies-right-pub-83133> accessed 26 
August 2021.  
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experts to help draft the citizen participants’ proposals in the fashion of French legal statutes. 
So, at the culmination of the CCC, itself preceded by the momentous Grand National Debate 
and Yellow Vests protests; the citizen participants of the CCC, the people of France and the 
media waited with baited breath to see what would become of the Convention’s 149 proposals 
to help France reduce carbon emissions. However, in a public address after the CCC’s final 
session, President Macron greeted France with a moment of national anti-climax: he would 
accept 146 of the 149 proposals, but use thee jokers (‘trump cards’) to reject what many saw 
as three of the most significant measures: ‘changing the Preamble of the Constitution, (…) 
imposing a 4% tax on corporate dividends to finance climate action, (…) reducing speed limits 
on motorways’.344 The radical constitutional reform to the Preamble ‘would have inscribed 
(…) that constitutional “right, freedoms and principles” “should not compromise the 
preservation of the environment, the common heritage of mankind”’.345 
 
Despite the majority of the proposals being accepted by the President, what was surprising was 
that Macron had blatantly broken a promise he had repeated on many occasions to pass 
whatever the CCC proposed into law, without intervention. In fact, the CCC’s presentation of 
their proposals to him was meant to be merely a formality, rather than an obstacle of legal 
scrutiny. Macron justified his decision by countering that the proposed constitutional 
amendment would threaten constitutional liberties by placing the ‘protection of nature’ above 
all other rights, and that further the tax on corporations would ‘be too damaging for France’s 
competitiveness’, while he referred to the proposal to reduce motorway speed limits as ‘a 
mistake similar to one he had made in the past, implicitly referring to one of the measures that 
 
344 Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet, et al.  “Deliberating on Climate Action: Insights from the French Citizens’ 
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sparked the Gilets Jaunes movement’.346 In following the French legislative procedure outlined 
in the first chapter, Macron would then go on to create a legislative proposal, known as the 
‘Climate and Resilience Bill’,347 out of the 146 remaining measures proposed by the CCC, in 
consultation with the Council of Ministers and the Council of State, to then be introduced into 
Parliament. 
 
Commentators initially viewed this outcome of 146 proposals being accepted by Macron as a 
‘political success’, but were weary of whether these measures would be ‘effectively 
implemented’, as there was no guarantee of any being passed ‘unfiltered’, now that the 
President had shown himself already willing to break his promise.348 While the measures were 
indicated by surveys to have ‘broad support (…) among the general population’, Macron gave 
no clear commitment to organising a referendum to gauge this popular approval.349 A large 
omission thus in the CCC’s mandate, whether intentional or not, was the ambivalence 
surrounding the promise to bring the proposals into law ‘unfiltered’; and what the normative 
value of that promise was. Indeed, the executive as we have seen retains a large discretionary 
prerogative, and thus no ultimate constitutional obligation to fulfil a promise, as the  
‘“unfiltered” commitment lacked a common understanding’; a promise which could be 
construed either as Macron undertaking a political duty to implement the CCC’s proposals 
without alteration, or on the other hand as conferring a legal duty onto the citizen participants 
to ‘produce readily implementable bills’.350 In any case, the damage was done, and Macron’s 
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bid at gaining legitimacy through the CCC was obstructed by his own counter-intuitive failure 
to deliver on his promise. Subsequently, the citizen participants of the CCC evaluated in a final 
meeting how the executive had considered their proposals, and concluded that the 
Government’s planned implementation of their measures would not allow France to meet its 
goal of reducing carbon emissions before 2030 by at least 40%; they scored Macron at an 
average of two and a half out of ten points on a scale measuring their trust in his passing the 
proposals to a degree which would meet the CCC’s initial constitutional mandate.351  
 
In the following summer of 2021, the CCC’s proposals were further abandoned, and Macron’s 
promise proportionately crippled. Despite not accepting to amend the Preamble of the 
Constitution, Macron was nonetheless receptive to the CCC’s proposed amendment to the First 
Article of the Constitution to incorporate that ‘the Republic guarantees the preservation of 
biodiversity, the environment and the fight against climate change’.352 However, the resulting 
bill was met with ‘inertia’ in the Senate, whose senators objected to the word ‘guarantee’ as 
creating ‘an obligation of results, as well as means’, and so on July 6th the Government formally 
abandoned the bill and planned climate referendum for the constitutional reform.353 As we will 
see in the next section, the Climate and Resilience Law intended to translate the remainder of 
the CCC’s proposals was ‘criticized for having discarded or watered down many of the 
Convention’s proposals’, many of which were ‘abandoned or only partially implemented’.354  
 
 
351 ‘La Convention citoyenne pour le climat attribue de mauvaises notes à l’exécutif quant à la reprise de ses 
propositions’ (Franceinfo, 28 February 2021) <https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/environnement/convention-
citoyenne-sur-le-climat/la-convention-citoyenne-pour-le-climat-attribue-de-mauvaises-notes-a-la-reprise-de-ses-
propositions-par-l-executif_4314437.html> accessed 26 August 2021.  
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ii. The ‘Climate and Resilience Law’ 
 
Following Macron’s broken promise to pass any of the CCC’s proposals directly into law in 
June of 2020, the 146 measures that he did not outrightly reject were sent along the traditional 
path of French legislative procedure. Just as with the inception of any legislative project, the 
President may be inspired by his own volition, or appealed to by various stakeholders or 
advisors such as the Council of State, though in this case the CCC served that role of proposing 
a new policy for the executive to legislatively pursue. Thus by December of the 2020, the 
Climate and Resilience bill was drafted by Government Ministers, and by the 10th of February 
2021, the bill had been approved by the Council of Ministers and introduced into Parliament.355 
By the 20th of July of 2021, the legislative project had been adopted by both the National 
Assembly and Senate, and after being approved by the Constitutional Council on the 13th of 
August, it was promulgated as the Climate and Resilience law on the 22nd of August 2021 and 
published in the Official Journals two days later, at the time of writing this thesis.356 The Law 
claims to translate ‘a part of the 146 propositions of the CCC retained by the head of State’ 
into over 300 articles and 100 resulting executive decrees for implementation, and is divided 
around the five themes the CCC deliberated on.357 Among its provisions are an engagement by 
France to lower its carbon emissions by as much as 55% by 2030, as well as the creation of 
new crimes of ‘ecocide’ and ‘endangering the environment’.358  
 
355 ‘Loi du 22 août 2021 portant lutte contre le dérèglement climatique et renforcement de la résilience face à ses 
effets’ (Vie publique.fr) <https://www.vie-publique.fr/loi/278460-loi-22-aout-2021-climat-et-resilience-
convention-citoyenne-climat> accessed 29 August 2021.  
356 Ibid.  
357 LOI n° 2021-1104 du 22 août 2021 portant lutte contre le dérèglement climatique et renforcement de la 
résilience face à ses effets <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000043956924?r=hZugnbG83O> 
accessed 29 August 2021.  
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Despite the Climate and Resilience Law’s self-presentation as an implementation of the CCC’s 
146 proposals, it has been widely criticised as superficial and insufficient in reaching the 
original mandate of lowering carbon emissions. The CESE itself who were delegated to 
organise the CCC gave their opinion on the resulting Law that it is ‘not in a measure to redress 
the climate situation and to consider social inequalities’, and further that ‘the annual rhythm of 
reducing emissions would need to be tripled’ to meet the stated goal, and thus that the Law’s 
measures are ‘often limited, deferred or resigned to conditions such as that their rapid 
implementation is uncertain’.359 Another institution of the executive branch, the Council of 
State, joined in this criticism and even ‘threatened the government with a fine of 10 million 
euros per semester if it doesn’t take more decisive action against air pollution’, due its ‘serious 
concerns regarding the government’s ability to honour its commitments under the 2015 Paris 
climate accord’.360 Climate activists and organisations furthered this sentiment, with the ‘WWF 
France [calling] the final version of the law “very far removed from the climate goals and 
expectations of citizens” while Greenpeace described it as “hugely disappointing”’.361 The 
degree of frustration at the Climate and Resilience Law was exemplified by a series of 
demonstrations organised by climate organisation, political leaders and the citizen participants 
of the CCC themselves, in which the protestors demanded a ‘Real Climate Law’.362 Laurence 
Tubiana, who we saw was a member of the governance committee of the CCC and drafter of 
 
359 ‘Climat, neutralité carbone et justice sociale - avis du CESE sur le projet de loi portant lutte contre le 
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the 2015 Paris climate accord joined an estimated 110,000 protestors, and urged for the Law 
to be rewritten with more ambition.363 The CCC must therein be seen as a flawed attempt at 
participatory democracy, if its intention to appease protests though more legitimate governance 
resulted in further disillusioned demonstrations by its own citizen participants and organisers.  
 
In light of Macron’s broken promises, and a criticised Climate and Resilience Law, the question 
remains: did the CCC have a normative impact? The conclusion most have drawn is that ‘the 
Convention’s impact on public policy is seen as limited’, and thus that the CCC was a ‘betrayal 
of the Government’s environmental promises, and a sabotage of a bold experiment in 
participatory democracy’.364 A more positive outlook would highlight that in any case the CCC 
‘can be said to have created a broader political momentum in that several jurisdictions not 
legally responsible for implementing the CCC’s measures have committed to do so, in 
particular a group of mayors of the largest French urban areas’, and thus that the CCC was 
nevertheless was ‘an important achievement (…)  [which] sets a possible path to aggressive 
reductions in France’s [carbon] emissions’.365 However, as for the CCC’s 146 proposals 
retained initially by Macron, only a staggering ten are seen to have been legislated into the 
Climate and Resilience Law completely ‘unfiltered’, such as the proposal for a ‘generalisation 
of education on the environment’ which appears unchanged in article 2 of the resulting Law.366  
 
363 ‘Forte mobilisation pour une « vraie loi climat », à la veille de l’examen au Parlement’ Le Monde.fr (28 
March 2021) <https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2021/03/28/nombreux-appels-a-manifester-a-travers-la-
france-pour-une-vraie-loi-climat_6074759_3244.html> accessed 29 August 2021.  
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The reason for this dramatic dilution of the CCC’s proposals has been largely attributed to the 
‘violent lobbying’ of concerned and powerful industrial sectors such as the automobile or 
aviation industries, who stood the most to lose financially from the taxes and other measures 
the CCC’s proposals would have levied on corporations to force a reduction in carbon 
emissions.367 It is not surprising then the resulting Climate and Resilience Law has been 
dismissed as merely ‘a few symbolic measures; a layer of green paint over the climate politics 
already in place’.368 To that end, our conclusion too must be that unfortunately the CCC’s 
normative impact was severely limited, and its initial promises far from lived up to.  
 
B) A failed experiment?  
 
i. The CCC – truly an instance of participatory democracy? 
 
In this thesis, we began by assessing participatory democracy as an umbrella term for the 
interwoven political theories of direct democracy, deliberative democracy, sortition and open 
democracy. We have seen that the CCC built upon an existing history of participatory practices 
in France and the more recent Grand National Debate in order to incorporate elements of direct, 
deliberative and lotocratic democracy on a scale never before seen in France. However, the 
CCC was ultimately limited in its normative impact, and was consequently felt as an anti-
climactic disappointment which failed to produce the legislative change it had been 
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nevertheless mandated. We have also seen that for Landemore’s conception of open 
democracy, the citizens of a given participatory forum must have the direct normative power 
to implement their proposals into law, and in my analysis, this normativity was the key missing 
ingredient in what could have otherwise been a true instance of participatory democracy to its 
fullest extent. If participatory democracy is a spectrum, then the CCC is certainly well 
advanced on that scale compared to other similar experiments certainly in France and even 
around the world, yet Macron’s potentially self-interested motives for organising the CCC and 
subsequent breaking of what was later revealed to be a false promises merely serves to further 
the disenchantment the French people feel towards their government as shown by the ‘Real 
Climate Law’ protests; the very waning of legitimacy that the CCC was supposed to alleviate. 
For this deceptive irony in the saga of the CCC, I submit that it cannot be characterised fully 
as an instance of participatory democracy, but should rather be understood as what I call a 
performative, or ‘puppet’ participatory democracy. Under this light, the ideals of participatory 
democracy are brandished as an illusory means to a bureaucratic end of securing its very 
opposite: increased executive power for the sovereign. In Landemore’s analysis, the CCC was 
a form of ‘participation-washing whereby power tries to regain legitimacy in a period of crisis 
by appearing to listen to the people’, and example of an ‘old system [which] will of course try 
to co-opt democratic innovations to keep things exactly the same’, for which she recalls 
‘Lampedusa’s famous line: “Everything needs to change, so everything can stay the same”’.369 
 
While we have seen that participatory democracy has a history in France, so do its critiques. 
Röcke so reports that during the French Presidential campaign of 2006, the Socialist candidate 
Ségolène Royal’s proposal to introduce ‘randomly elected citizen juries for evaluating public 
policies’ was met with ‘a wave of protest from all political camps’, and denounced the ‘idea of 
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direct citizen participation’ as ‘a demagogy close to populism’.370 Röcke attributes this 
animosity to ‘the “universality” of French Republicanism [which] also disregards the existence 
of ethnic communities, of regional specificities and of any kind of cultural differences in the 
public sphere’,  and thus that a tension has arisen in France between ‘on the one hand, the “one 
and indivisible republic” which could not tolerate any sub-national rivals, and the claim to sub-
national and decentralised autonomy, on the other’.371 Indeed, participatory democracy 
generally tends to be caught in a conflict of legitimacy between the random selection of directly 
participating untrained citizens versus the (theoretically) autonomous election of trained 
politicians, with both paradigms inevitably relying on some form of representation, justified 
precisely by those opposing means to the abstract yet ultimately unattainable end of securing 
‘legitimate’ governance: equal chance of selection versus autonomous choice.  
 
Therein, the CCC was afflicted by criticisms stemming from common cautions surrounding 
participatory democracy in a broader sense: what is the legitimacy of a mini-public 
participating in decisions involving a broader public, and are its proposals acceptable to a 
broader population which does not get a voice in the shaping of those proposals? Perhaps mini-
publics are too small to be sufficiently representative and diverse, and are skewered towards 
participation by those with the means to give up their ordinary lives and incomes. Participatory 
democracy is oft derided as hypocritical in that it is not truly direct, but rather just another form 
of representation, but by less ‘trained’ people in a party-less system who the general population 
have no autonomy in choosing, thus creating a certain oligarchy opposite to the promised 
democracy. It is not for this thesis to reply to these critiques, of which many are interesting and 
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valid, yet my point is rather to show that the CCC was limited in its normative impact by this 
general apprehension surrounding participatory democracy.  
 
The perceived legitimacy of the CCC was not helped by its being under the supervision of the 
executive, and thus it was entirely denounced as ‘an “entirely illegitimate gadget”, undermining 
the authority of the parliament’.372 Girard is skeptical of the CCC’s claim to legitimacy due to 
its assertion that it was politically representative due to its participants being ‘ordinary 
citizens’, whereas he notes that ‘being “ordinary” simply means not having been elected – an 
insufficient, if paradoxical, ground for political representation’, which is only proven less 
convincing as the particular deliberative setting the citizens participate in ‘actually increases 
the difference of perspectives between the participants and the “ordinary” citizens’, which 
Girard says is proven by the CCC’s own stated preference to not submit its proposals to 
referendum for fear that the general population would not understand how those measures were 
reached.373 Further, the CCC did not allow the deliberation of ‘ordinary citizens without 
mediation’, due to its emphasis on ‘the role of the organisers as well as the significant input 
from the technical experts and jurists’.374 Girard concludes that the framing of a citizens’ 
convention as more legitimate ‘can only pit the citizens’ assembly against the parliament, as 
their rivalry is then not only about the accomplishment of a particular task, but also about the 
representation of the people’, and importantly warns that ‘such a competition is bound to 
weaken both institutions, to the potential benefit of the executive power’.375 This rings true to 
the analysis of this thesis, that the CCC’s ultimate aims at its outset were undermined by the 
executive nature of the French Fifth Republic, which perhaps intentionally designed the CCC 
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as a receptacle for the frustrations of the protesting French people, to divert their attention and 
feelings of illegitimacy.  
 
Further critiques of the CCC lay for example in the broad mandate it was given, and the ‘major 
limitation [of] the cruelly insufficient 40%-target set [to reduce carbon emissions]’, which led 
to the participants ‘self-censoring’ and ‘avoiding thorny issues such as the role of nuclear 
power in the French energy mix, or a truly comprehensive carbon tax which was left 
unaddressed after some strongly opposed discussing it for fear of cautioning the 
government’.376 Paradoxically then, a mountainous task was handed upon the citizen 
participants with the inhibition of a confined target, whereas clearly as has been shown by the 
critiques of the Climate and Resilience Law, a problem as global as climate change will require 
solutions equally as important. Finally, as is unsurprising following the analysis throughout 
this thesis, the CCC was impeded by its lack of ‘legal grounding’, as Denz quotes 
‘environmental law scholar Arnaud Gossement, who stressed that (…) “the whole architecture 
of this convention, all its credibility, rests on trusting the word of Emmanuel Macron (…); it is 
profoundly monarchical”’.377 Denz therein situates the CCC on the previously discussed 
Arnstein’s ladder (which ranks the normativity of a participatory exercise), at the level of 
‘consultation’ as it ‘offered no assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will be taken into 
account’, and he notes that the Citizens Vests specifically warned the President against such 
‘tokenism’ in an open letter following the CCC.378 
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However, in my view, this determination may be too generous. Arnstein defined citizen 
participation as ‘a categorical term for citizen power’, which ‘enables the have-not citizens, 
presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in 
the future’, with an emphasis on direct normativity akin to Landemore’s conception of 
participation in an open democracy.379 Arnstein’s ladder is thus a spectrum of participation, 
from the lowest non-participatory rung of ‘manipulation’ to the highest degree of participation 
she entitles ‘citizen control’, where the ‘have-nots handle the entire job of planning, policy 
making and managing a programme (…) with no intermediaries’.380 Kelty elaborates on 
Arnstein that participation tends to ‘formatted in ways that cramp and dwarf it’, and thus 
emphasises that ‘inclusion is not participation’.381 As we have seen, the CCC’s internal 
governance was in and of itself a ladder of participation, with the 150 citizen participants at the 
bottom of a normative chain below the five organising committees of the CCC, themselves 
organised by the CESE, accountable ultimately to the President. My assertion in this section is 
that the CCC was not truly an instance of participatory democracy, because it was a 
performative participatory forum puppeteered by the sovereign Macron, with the latter ladder 
of normative power corresponding to the puppet strings by which he maintained ultimate 
control over the outcomes of the CCC, which as we saw were ultimately diluted due to their 
perhaps unforeseen ambition. Therein, I would not class the CCC as merely consultative on 
Arnstein’s ladder, but also as exhibiting elements of manipulation and placation, where the 
Government ‘allows citizens to advise or plan ad infinitum but retains for power holders the 
right to judge the legitimacy or feasibility of the advice’.382 In assessing the CCC’s actual 
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impact on French governance, I argue that the CCC ‘failed’ normatively because the citizen 
participants were used by greater powers, rather than truly granted power themselves, in order 
to make the executive seem more legitimate. Thus, in my view, the CCC was not authentic and 
substantive participatory democracy, but performative and puppet participation.  
 
ii. A consultative constitutional nature 
 
Socrates famously warned against the Athenian model of participatory democracy, that a 
trained captain rather than a randomly selected citizen should helm the ‘Ship of State’.383 It is 
my principle argument in this thesis that the CCC’s actual normative impact on French 
governance was limited due its intentional organisation under the CESE as a consultative 
constitutional body, wherein the executive ultimately retained sovereign control at the helm of 
the French Ship of State. The tension between legislative and executive branches, and further 
between representative and participatory democracy, stretch back to the origins of early 
democracy, and this tension inevitably arose after Macron’s perhaps initially well-intentioned 
creation of the CCC began to challenge his own power. Macron is facing re-election in the next 
2022 Presidential race, and perhaps so organised the CCC to shift anger at him exhibited by 
the Yellow Vests protests away to a puppet institution. He perhaps did not expect for the CCC 
to take its role seriously, as it has been given a ridiculously broad mandate, and so when the 
President retreated and broke his promise to pass any CCC proposal ‘unfiltered’, Macron 
countered his critics by ‘complaining that some members had gone too far and exceeded their 
advisory role’, angrily commenting ‘you can't say that just because 150 citizens wrote 
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something, it's the Bible or the Koran’.384 The CCC was intended not to normatively reform 
the law, despite the initial promises by Macron to the CCC that ‘you’re not here to be used 
(…); you’re here to create collective intelligence and help me decide things together’.385 
Rather, he likely was literal in his word choice of ‘help me’, as the CCC was indisputably a 
consultative assembly by the end of its run, although there had been sufficient ambiguity 
throughout to increase the trust of the citizen participants and the people.386 
 
In my analysis, I submit that Macron paid lip-service to the idea of participatory democracy in 
order to appear more legitimate without substantially needing to make any constitutional 
change. This is consolidated by his modus operandi for similarly performative attempts to 
regain his legitimacy, such as his tour during the Grand National Debate which we saw was 
criticised as a participatory front for a political campaign with local mayors. After the CCC 
had finished, Macron made another performative gesture of closing down his own alma mater, 
the National School of Administration (ENA), which is infamous as a technocratic training 
ground for ‘the country’s ruling class since 1945’, including three of the last four French 
presidents.387 Similarly to the performance of the CCC, Macron did not reform the arguably 
more elitist ‘selective entrance process (…) criticized by many as biased against students from 
 
384 Welle D, ‘France’s Citizen Climate Assembly: A Failed Experiment?’ (DW.COM) 16.02.2021 
<https://www.dw.com/en/frances-citizen-climate-assembly-a-failed-experiment/a-56528234> accessed 26 
August 2021.  
385 Hurst A, ‘France Turns to Citizen-Legislators to Craft Climate Reforms’ (The American Prospect, 18 
February 2020) <https://prospect.org/api/content/f45e8ca8-51ad-11ea-8c1c-1244d5f7c7c6/> accessed 5 August 
2021.  
386 Benoit Delooz, 'Challenges and Political, Institutional and Normative Perspectives of the Citizens' 
Assemblies: An Approach Based on the Example of the Citizens’ Climate Convention' (2020) 10(3) Brazilian 
Journal of Public Policy 636. 
387 ‘Macron Closes Elite School in Reformist Push’ (POLITICO, 8 April 2021) 
<https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-closes-elite-school-in-reformist-push/> accessed 26 August 2021.  
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poorer backgrounds’, but found the gesture of shutting down his old university sufficient to 
appear more legitimate against the common critique of him by the Yellow Vests protestors, 
that he is part of an aristocracy out of touch with average French problems.388 Chwalisz and 
Van Reybrouk, both proponents of participatory democracy and the former respectively 
involved in the running of the CCC as well as the OECD report cited in this thesis, have 
commented on this shallow participation advocated by Macron they call a ‘sham 
democracy’.389 Macron proposed a citizens’ convention at a European level, but in a model 
which they denounce as characteristically ‘archaic, elitist, and out-of-touch’ , where the ‘result 
of these gatherings will be a wish list of unrealistic demands — easily ignored after the box of 
“citizen consultation” has been ceremoniously ticked’.390  
 
Girard therein analyses the impotent outcome of the CCC as resulting from three interrelated 
ambiguities, the first of which concerned the ‘advisory or binding nature of its proposals’, 
where despite the ‘political rhetoric’ that Macron had promised to pass the CCC’s proposals 
‘unfiltered’; ‘the Convention only had an advisory role’, and ‘the Government had only 
committed to “give a public response”’.391 Girard views the second ambiguity as concerning 
‘the kind of proposal to be produced’, where the ‘procedural indeterminacy was presented by 
the Government as a proof of the leeway given to the assembly’, whereas in reality it knew that  
‘to leave open the procedural outcome is to disconnect the institutional features of the assembly 
from its function’.392 Finally, the third ambiguity resulting in the executive’s purposeful 
 
388 Ibid.  
389 Claudia Chwalisz and David Van Reybrouck ‘Macron’s Sham Democracy’ (POLITICO, 12 February 2018) 
<https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-populism-sham-democracy-plans-to-revamp-decision-making-
disappointing/> accessed 26 August 2021. 
390 Ibid.  
391 Charles Girard ‘Lessons from the French Citizens’ Climate Convention’, supra, note 266. 
392 Ibid.  
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diminishment of the CCC’s normative impact concerned ‘the nature of the task given to the 
convention’, which as we have seen, was so broad so as to ‘make participants heavily 
dependent on the advice of experts (…) [and] also ’invites them to produce a long list of 
heterogeneous measures, allowing the government to cherry-pick’.393 It is clear then that 
Macron in a sense gaslighted the CCC’s participants into believing they had the normative 
power to propose legislative reform, when in reality the CCC was structurally designed to 
manipulatively inhibit that very power. Girard concludes that: 
 
‘These ambiguities are interrelated, as the appropriate scope of a political body’s mandate 
depends on its normative power and on the proposals it has to produce. Together, they created 
uncertainty regarding the role the Convention, weakened its ability to impact public policy, 
and set expectations that could hardly be met. But they are in no way intrinsic to citizens‘ 
assemblies per se. Rather, they result from the way the Convention was set up’.394 
 
The question relevant to this thesis is: did this infiltration of the executive into the CCC truly 
have a muzzling effect on its participatory efforts? We saw in the first chapter that participatory 
democracy in France since the 21st century has a tendency to become bureaucratised, due to 
the Fifth Republic’s deep emphasis on centralised public administration, and it should have 
been evident that any attempt at participatory democracy under the auspices of the CCC, 
especially when organised by the executive, would also inevitably be affected by the traces of 
France’s constitutional arrangements. This in some sense reveals Derrida’s phenomenon of 
différance: that the two entities (or metaphysical ‘texts’) of participatory democracy on the one 
 
393 Ibid.  
394 Ibid.  
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hand, and the French Constitution on the other, would necessarily be infinitely different and 
ever-differed in a double-bind when brought together to be mutually interpreted.  
 
Derrida disagreed with his intellectual rival Hans-Georg Gadamer that in a dialogue of 
meanings, ‘two horizons could melt into one’, and that a mutual understanding could be 
reached, but rather saw any attempt at this dialogue as an ‘act of totalisation’ which does 
‘hegemonic violence’ to the object of interpretation, thus rendering all dialogue to be 
‘characterised by an untranslatability or interruption which serves to infinitely multiply new 
(mis)understandings’.395 Legrand, who we saw in our earlier deconstructive analysis employs 
Derridean hermeneutics to his culturalist theory of comparative legal transfer, applies Derrida’s 
pessimism regarding dialogue to assert that a legal dialogue of sorts between two cultural-legal 
contexts or polities results in the ‘impossibility of legal transplants’, which many theorists such 
as his own intellectual rival Alan Watson have asserted are nevertheless functionally 
responsible for a perceived ‘uniformization of law’.396 Essentially, in following Derrida’s post-
structuralist analysis, the introduction of one idea, legal or otherwise, into a new context, cannot 
in Legrand’s opinion operate as a simple transplant, where the new body either takes or rejects 
the input and then goes on with its ordinary functioning. Rather, the process of legal transfer is 
more nuanced, and to an extent, impossible. For example, as we have seen, France attempted 
to implement a Westminster system into its Fifth Republic by placing the Prime Minister as 
the head of the executive, accountable to Parliament. However, the French history of caesarean 
executives and the immediate background of the Second World War and the Algerian War of 
Independence meant that this attempted ‘transplant’ immediately transfigured under De 
Gaulle’s strong leadership, in which he returned prerogative power to the President.  
 
395 Pierre Legrand, ‘Derrida’s Gadamer’ supra, note 23, p. 160. 
396 Ibid, p162. 
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Gunther Teubner has proposed an alternate metaphor to that of ‘legal transplant’ for this 
Derridean interruption caused by a legal transfer: that of the ‘legal irritant’.397 Teubner explains 
that ‘when a foreign rule is imposed on a domestic culture (…) it is not transplanted into another 
organism, rather it works as a fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and 
unexpected events (…) and forces them (the domestic culture) to reconstruct internally not only 
their own rules but to reconstruct from scratch the alien element itself’.398 To return to the 
internal governance then of the CCC, it reveals that an attempt at incorporating participatory 
democracy into the French Constitution inevitably permeated that new ‘alien element’, as 
Teubner put it, with the traces of a supreme executive and tendency towards bureaucratisation 
inherent to the context of the Fifth Republic. The CCC represents the product of legal irritation 
caused to both the French polity and the idea of participatory democracy, as they attempted a 
metaphysical dialogue through the Convention, and were forced to adapt themselves, with one 
inevitably doing hegemonic violence to the other. It appears in the case of the CCC, the French 
Constitution had the upper hand as the domestic culture, and was little affected by the alien 
element of the participatory experiment.  
 
However, perhaps this phenomenon of resistance to participatory democracy is not unique to 
France, as Choudhry and Tushnet note that there is an ‘inescapable need within a participatory 
process for the delegation of some decision-making authority regarding constitutional drafting 
to a smaller group of individuals—experts, politicians, and/or “ordinary” citizens—means that 
direct democracy cannot completely supplant representative democracy’.399 This was indeed 
 
397 Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergences’, (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11. 
398 Ibid, p12.  
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the case with the legal expert committee to the CCC, whose devolved internal governance 
perhaps revealed a flaw within participatory democracy as it is currently implemented in 
various Citizens’ Conventions across the world: that when introduced to a non-participatory 
constitution, an intermediary constitutional body will be created to keep a participatory 
assembly in check.  
 
My argument in this thesis has been then that the executive supremacy and colonial origins of 
the French Fifth Republic were constitutionally opposed to fostering the CCC in an authentic 
way, but rather forced it into a subservient performative mutation of an irritated participatory 
democracy. This failure of participatory democracy in encounters with unreceptive host 
constitutions has been noted by Choudhry and Tushnet, who in commenting on the failed 
Icelandic constitutional crowdsourcing experiment noted that this failure ‘resulted largely from 
the refusal of established political elites to buy in to the constitutional draft, [which] might 
suggest a different lesson from the Icelandic process—that it failed because it did not take elite 
concerns seriously enough’.400 They aptly describe our French scenario with by warning that 
political elites are ‘concerned in part with preserving their ability to compete about control over 
those institutions’ and ‘demonstrate little concern for expanded rights or direct democracy’.401 
To return to a Habermasian analysis, Macron retained sovereignty of the formal decision 
making sphere by not allowing the CCC to exit the public sphere: he maintained control of the 
‘sluice’: ‘systems of water channels controlled at their heads by a gate (…) [whose] image is 
used to characterize the intermediary bodies and procedures between official decision makers 
and the public’.402 
 
400 Sujit Choudhry and Mark Tushnet, ‘Participatory constitution- making: Introduction’, supra, note 71. 
401 Ibid.  
402 Landemore, ‘Open Democracy and Digital Technologies’, supra, note 60.  
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To conclude this section, I would like to briefly speculate on the tension between the 
President’s promise to pass the CCC’s proposals ‘unfiltered’ and his eventual executive 
decision to go back on that promise, which he never may have intended to be binding in the 
first place, as we have seen. There is a tension then in the Habermasian spheres to which the 
CCC belongs, in a sort of Schrödinger’s Habermas’ spheres, if you will: the CCC was at once 
normative and consultative, in the time period between Macron’s promise and breaking of his 
promise. We saw that the CCC was granted a constitutional mandate by the President to 
produce proposals which were ready to be codified, and yet we have also seen that the President 
retains ultimate sovereignty in the French Constitution. However, if the President used this 
authority to grant the CCC power, then perhaps the CCC’s mandate must take precedence over 
the President’s own power. I submit that this constitutional tension is an example of the classic 
‘God paradox’: if there is a God, and it is omnipotent, then can it weaken or even destroy itself? 
To weaken itself would prove that it can be less than omnipotent, but to not weaken itself would 
prove that there is something not within the God’s power. Perhaps then some form of 
constitutional promissory estoppel could be retroactively applied to Macron’s promise, which 
itself was a delegation of constitutional executive power to the CCC, a new institution not 
accounted for by the French Fifth Republic, to normatively bring its proposals to law. If Macron 
could delegate this executive power in this sense, then he is compromises his sovereignty, but 
if he cannot, then he is not truly sovereign either. In any case, it is clear his broken promise had 
a damaging effect on the citizen participants of the CCC, and all those who trusted it would be 
a legitimate experiment in ‘unfiltered’ participatory democracy.  
 
In this thesis, I have neglected the judicial branch of the French Constitution, which I noted in 
the first chapter nevertheless has an increasing power of judicial review, as in many 
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contemporary liberal democratic polities. In France, there was a constitutional reform in 2008 
which granted the Constitutional Council the power to be seized by any citizen to judicially 
review the constitutionality of a law or government action in the course of an ongoing case, 
called the question prioritaire de constitutionalité (‘priority question of constitutionality’ or 
QPC).403 I mean here to speculate that perhaps such a judicial review could be undertaken 
against Macron’s decision to break his promise to pass all the CCC’s proposals ‘unfiltered’, 
ultimately resulting in a Climate and Resilience Law reproducing only ten of those 149 
proposals. One could imagine perhaps a civil suit regarding a legal issue of the Climate and 
Resilience Law, maybe in an attempt to enforce one of its provisions restricting corporate 
carbon emissions. In the midst of that case, a QPC could be requested, regarding he specific 
matter of legitimate expectations of the citizen participants of the CCC and the people of France 
that the promise to pass the proposals ‘unfiltered’ would be constitutionally respected. That 
promise could be seen as a prerogative created under De Gaulle’s presidential imprint on the 
Constitution, in the vein of the famous UK GCHQ case, where the UK Supreme Court found 
that a breach of legitimate expectations created by the executive could be judicially 
reviewed.404 
 
There are two French precedents for this hypothetical judicial review, which of course is 
inspired by the common legal tradition and may not have any place in France’s continental 
courts. Nonetheless, the Constitutional Council in 2008 decided that the Charter for the 
Environment of 2004 should be considered as being constitutionally normative.405 We have 
seen that Article 7 of that Charter enshrines the right ‘to participate in the public decision-
 
403 Michel Verpeaux, ‘Le Conseil Constitutionnel’ (Documentation Française 2nd edition, 2014) p140. 
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taking process likely to affect the environment’.406 Further, when the Constitutional Council 
was seized on the 13th of August 2021 to review the constitutionality of the Climate and 
Resilience Law resulting from the CCC, it was argued by sixty Members of Parliament and 
various organisations such as Greenpeace in amicus curiae briefs that that law was not 
sufficiently ambitious so as to meet France’s objectives under the Paris accord of 2015 to 
reduced its carbon emissions.407 In fact, while this argument did not persuade the Court to 
overturn the Climate and Resilience Law which has since been promulgated, a similar 
argument was made to the German Constitutional Court which in that case did find the 
insufficient German Climate Law as unconstitutional.408 
 
The purpose of this speculation was merely to suggest that, despite the consultative 
constitutional nature of the CCC which limited its actual impact, this could in theory be 
hypothetically challenged at a judicial level, which is one of the few institutions in France to 
retain the power to contradict the sovereign caesarean executive.  
 
C) The institutionalisation of participatory democracy 
 
i. The CCC’s proposals and institutional reform of the CESE 
 
 
406 Ibid.  
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Now that we have analysed the actual impact of the CCC on French governance, I would like 
to briefly conclude this final chapter by speculating on the potential impact of the CCC. My 
argument here is that the CCC nonetheless led to the beginnings of institutionalisation of 
participatory democracy in France, and may have inspired other citizens’ assemblies beyond 
in other polities.  
 
On the 15th of January 2021, an organic law was published in the Official Journals which would 
reform the CESE that had organised the CCC into the ‘chamber of citizen participation’.409 
This new reform would see the consultative body retain its consultative constitutional nature, 
yet increase its participatory methodology, in that it can be seized by public petition as well as 
the Government to organise participatory forums. This reform to the body stemmed in fact 
from one of the CCC’s own proposals, and is one of the few to have been implemented.410 Of 
course, this was likely allowed by Macron because the body would remain explicitly 
consultative, but there is a hope by participatory researchers that nonetheless this will result in 
further steps towards more open, normative, participatory democracy, perhaps even someday 
replacing the Senate entirely with a participatory chamber.411 
 
Further, there is a ‘Citizens’ Assembly for Paris’ in the works: a local permanent participatory 
forum to the municipality of Paris, which would only the second of its kind to have agenda-
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setting normative power after the Ostbeglien model, and was likely inspired by the recent 
events of the CCC, however little detail is yet available on the project aside from a recent job 
post listing by the Government of Paris looking for a Secretary General to run the Assembly.412 
 
Finally, there is evidence that the Conference on the Future of the European Union, organised 
by EU Commissioner Von Der Leyen, which will incorporate several Citizens’ Conferences 
across the EU to discuss constitutional reform, was inspired by Macron’s (perhaps 
performative) calls for an EU Citizens’ Assembly, which researchers such as Landemore 
equally hope may take permanent institutional form.413 On a related note, a Global Citizens’ 
Assembly is being organised on Climate to deliberate the upcoming COP26, and is being 
organised in part by ‘Open Democracy’ team we saw helped to organise the Grand National 
Debate and CCC in France.414 
 
It is clear then that the CCC’s potential impact may be far further reaching that its limited actual 
normative impact: the CCC itself and subsequent research on it may inspire and help to refine 
further participatory experiments around the world, and contribute to further 
institutionalisation of more normative open participatory democracy in France.  
 
However, I conclude in a warning that real participatory democracy in France may likely 
require a new 6th Republic, with a constitution explicitly committed to participatory 
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democracy, and disentangled from the executive and colonial past of the current Constitution 




This thesis has sought to analyse the recent event of the CCC, in order to determine what its 
actual and potential impact on French governance have been.  
 
In the first chapter, I used a postcolonial critique and deconstructive analysis to introduce 
participatory democracy as an idea which stems from beyond ancient Athens, and which found 
itself bureaucratised in the French constitutional context due to the Fifth Republic’s deep-
rooted traces of colonialism and caesarean executive power.  
 
The second chapter used this background exploration in order to zoom in on the case study of 
the CCC, and explain how it arose from the Yellow Vests movement and the experiment of the 
Grand National Debate. In critically laying out the CCC’s constitutional mandate, internal 
governance and the methodology behind its participants’ selection and deliberation, I argued 
that the CCC too was nonetheless limited by the same bureaucracy as participatory democracy 
had been in the early 21st century at a local level in France, and that the CCC could have 
benefited from further intersectionality.  
 
The final third chapter concluded with my arguments on the impact of the CCC on French 
governance. I found that its actual normative impact was limited due to its consultative 
constitutional nature in the shadow of a colonial and presidential Fifth Republic. President 
Macron, I submit, used the CCC as a performative, or puppet, participatory democracy, to 
attempt to increase his own legitimacy. However, the potential impact of the CCC can be seen 
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through its causing the institutionalisation of the CESE, thus the CCC can be seen as having 
re-introduced participatory democracy into French governance. In the end, I reflect that real 
participatory democracy in France may require a new 6th Republic.  
 
My arguments have been limited by the proximity of the writing of this thesis to the 
promulgation of the Climate and Resilience Law which arose from the CCC, so it may have 
been pre-mature to assess the impact of the CCC only a year after it has finished. Further, I did 
not engage in depth with the many orbiting theories and critiques of participatory democracy, 
as I wished to narrow the thesis down specifically onto the CCC case study. In any case, more 
research is needed on participatory democracy in practice, in order to better understand 
citizens’ conventions from a socio-legal point of view.  
 
Future research in this field may go on to explore further consequences of the CCC or instances 
of participatory democracy in France, or compare the CCC to the many other emerging 
citizens’ conventions around the world. Further, research on how to include theories of 
intersectionality, anarcho-communist democratic communalism, postcolonial and subaltern 
counter-publics, and critical disability rights could all be interesting to explore in relation to 
making participatory democracy even more inclusive and accessible. Relatedly, there is much 
exciting new research on digitalisation, technology and participatory democracy which could 
help to increase its diverse collective wisdom. 
 
There is an exciting field on the rise known as ‘legal design’, defined as ‘the application of 
human-centred design to law to make it more accessible and innovative to users’.415 
 
415 Margaret Hagan, ‘Legal Design as a Thing: A Theory of Change and a Set of Methods to Craft a Human-
Centered Legal System’ Design Issues Volume 36 Issue 3 (2020) p.3-15. 
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Theoretically, design-thinking promotes ‘structured-yet-free’ spaces and encourages being 
‘critical, imaginative and practical’ in approaching design.416 Methodologically rich, ‘legal 
design promotes the use of model-making, prototyping and visualisation.417 Legal Design 
applies design to legal research and issues, with an ethos that centralises user experience in the 
creative process, focusses on creating quick prototypes to solve a problem, and then tests them 
until they meet a particular need.418 Future research could perhaps explore the relevance of this 
field, which has its own strand of participatory (design) research,419 to the themes in 
participatory democracy which this thesis has explored, such as the epistemological value of 
diverse ‘collective wisdom’ or participant selection and deliberation methodologies. 
Constitutional research in any case tends to either employ the term ‘design’, but without the 
substance of design theories, or engages in design but not intentionally, so the two fields may 
have many unexplored parallels which could be revealed if an explicit dialogue was fostered 
between the two.420 
 
To conclude, I wish to return to Sieyès’ sketch for a final reflection. This thesis has shown that 
participatory democracy as embodied by the CCC challenges the traditional Kelsenian 
hierarchical pyramid of constitutionalism represented by Sieyès, and may even seek to replace 
the pyramid with a public sphere of open democracy. Nevertheless, a more accurate iteration 
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of the sketch for the Fifth Republic would place the executive squarely at the centre instead of 
the legislative branch. Whether or not it is desirable to have participatory democracy is a 
tangential question which I will not answer here, but the sketch is more interesting to me 
because it represents a series of design choices and assumptions made about the constitutional 
spatial organisation for France’s First Republic. In my eyes, the CCC asks us to ponder: what 
if Sieyès had organised his sketch differently? How has design influenced Sieyès’ and other 
drafters constitutional choices? What if the governance of our polities were other to the way 
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